

Modern African Wars (3)

South-West Africa



Helmoed-Römer Heitman • Illustrated by Paul Hannon

Men-at-Arms • 242

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Series editor Martin Windrow

THE REGION IN THE 1960s–80s

The operational area of northern South-West Africa stretched the length of the 1,500km border with Angola and Zambia, covering a wide variety of terrain and vegetation. Southern Angola is very similar in terrain and vegetation, except that the Cunene River allows stronger vegetation along its course. The land to its west is largely rolling grassland once the southern hills are passed.

Kaokoland in the west consists of a narrow strip of Namib desert along the coast and rough, hilly terrain inland. It is very dry, with the vegetation changing west to east from sparse grasslands to dry forest. The Cunene River, the border with Angola, rises strongly during the rainy season, becoming dangerous to cross. Kaokoland is very isolated, and has a population of only 20,000. It has only one town, Opuwa, and very little infrastructure. What economic activity there is, centres on cattle farming.

Owambo stretches along 450km of the border and is about 120km deep. It is exceptionally flat, with hardly any natural features higher than an average African anthill, and generally sandy with areas of very thick bush. What little rain there is—500mm in a good year—fills innumerable shallow depressions called *oshonas* or *omurambas*, putting large parts under water during the rainy season. Summer daytime temperatures are in the low 30s C (high 80s–low 90s F), dropping to the high 20s C (low 80s F) in winter, when the nights can bring low single figures.

Owambo is the home region of the largest single population group—610,000 Owambos out of a total population of 1,300,000. Some 300,000 of them live permanently in Owambo, others having moved south in search of work. The largest Owambo tribe, the Kwanjama, is also strongly represented in southern Angola, their original homelands having been split by one of the many unhappy colonial borders. There are three towns—Oshakati, Ondangwa, Ruacana—and some villages, but most Owambos live in family kraals. The population is concentrated in north-central Owambo, other parts being thinly populated. There are just over 1,000 kilometres of roads, of which the 207-kilometre main north-south road and that to Ruacana are tarred, most others being surfaced gravel roads. There is also a maze of local tracks, some no more than a recent set of tyre tracks.

The economy is based on stock farming and some cultivation. Some smaller industries and organised handicrafts began to take hold in the late 1980s. There are also several thousand small traders running 'Cuca shops', named after the Angolan Cuca beer, some of them no more than a pile of goods under a convenient makalani palm, others with modern buildings and a large car outside.

Kavango, West Caprivi and Bushmanland together cover some 63,300 square kilometres. This region is a mix of dry forest land, sand dunes and *omurambas*. The vegetation along the Kavango is dense and subtropical. Rundu is the only town and has the only major airfield. There is a tarred road to Grootfontein, and a gravel road runs east-west along the Kavango. The other roads deteriorate



Tea-break for an Eland-90 crew under a Makalani palm, a characteristic feature of Owambo.

into semi-swamps in the rainy season, some impassable even to four-wheel-drive vehicles. Most of the population of 140,000 live in traditional villages along the banks of the Kavango. Some have linked into communities large enough to support schools, shops and clinics. West Caprivi is a nature reserve. Its largest population centre was the 210 Battalion Bushman community at Omega. Bushmanland is home to the few thousand SWA Bushmen. The economy of the area centres on subsistence agriculture. Cattle are farmed for meat and milk, and are used for transport. Hunting, river fishing and wild fruit supplement the diet.

East Caprivi has an area of just over 11,500 square kilometres, and is bounded by a 'cut line' and the Zambezi in the north, the Linyati and Chobe rivers in the south, and the Kwando river in the west. In the east it touches on Zimbabwe. It is 200km west to east and 80km north to south at its widest points. It is a sub-tropical region, characterised by dense forests interspersed with open grasslands. Average annual rainfall is 880mm, rising to over 1,000mm in a wet year, when almost half of the region turns into impassable swamps. The rivers overflow their banks during the rainy season in most years, constantly changing the topography. Summer temperatures often rise to over 40 degrees C (104°F).

Malaria, bilharzia and sleeping sickness are endemic. Katima Mulilo is the only town. The only major airfield is at Mpacha. The main road between Katima and Rundu is tarred up to Kongola, 110km from Katima, where it enters West Caprivi. The area has only 42,000 people and the economy is very limited, there being no

mineral resources—even building material has to be brought in— and no ready market for other products. There is some cultivation and cattle farming for local consumption. Lake and river fishing was a major source of protein until a drought in the mid-1980s dried up Lake Liambezi.

CHRONOLOGY

- 1915** German South-West Africa occupied by South African forces.
- 1920** South Africa granted a League of Nations 'C' Mandate—which made no provision for independence—over South-West Africa.
- 1946** The old Mandate system replaced by the UN Trusteeship system. South Africa refuses to recognise this change.
- 1949** The International Court of Justice ruled that the Mandate is still in effect.
- 1956** The United Nations resolved to negotiate to end South African rule over SWA.
- 1957** The Owambo People's Congress formed in Cape Town.
- 1959** OPC renamed Owambo People's Organisation.
- 1960** OPO renamed South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) to disguise its tribal nature. Its aim was independence and 'one man one vote', giving the majority (50% +) Owambo tribe control.
- 1961** First SWAPO national congress in Windhoek decided on 'armed revolution'.
- 1962** People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) formed.
- 1963** The armed revolution planned in Dar es Salaam.

Typical central Owambo terrain – featureless apart from anthills, bush, and small kraals.

The Campaigns

1964

The Caprivi African National Union (CANU) merged with SWAPO, the only party to do so. 500 SWAPO trainees in Tanzania; advanced training in Algeria, China, Cuba, Egypt, North Korea and the USSR. Bases set up in south-west Zambia.

1965


The first terrorists entered Owambo in September on an armed propaganda/recruiting mission. Recruited 30 Owambo men for very basic local training. The police began to track them. The OAU recognised SWAPO as a 'national liberation movement'.

1966

On 26 August heliborne Police raided their Ongulumbashe camp—arresting 9, killing 2. Other terrorists attacked several headmen and shot up the Oshikango border post. 36 were arrested within weeks. Others infiltrated but did no better—by year end 8 had died, 59 been arrested and the rest had fled. The International Court of Justice rejected a challenge by Liberia and Ethiopia to South Africa's right to rule SWA.

1967

SWAPO accepted that insurgency was not yet feasible in Owambo, turning instead to East Caprivi near its Zambian camps. A Police patrol ambushed there in



The bush was often thicker than this, making patrolling very difficult. The terrorists made their greatest efforts during the wet season, when there was maximum cover; only in the dry season was there any real visibility in bush areas, and SWAPO soon learned to stay their side of the cut-line until the rains came.



March arrested its ambushers. Small groups entered Caprivi to intimidate headmen and recruit. Most were arrested. PLAN's 'Supreme Commander' died in a clash on a Zambezi passenger barge. Owambo was quiet. The UN created a 'Council for SWA' to take over the administration of SWA.

1968

178 terrorists were arrested and 2 killed between May 1967 and April 1968. The SAAF deployed Alouette IIIs and Cessna 185s to Rundu in May to support the Police. Owambo was so quiet that the Police COIN teams withdrew. Two large terrorist groups entered Owambo in October. The Police returned, arresting 56 in a week. Terrorism in Owambo came to a virtual halt by year end. It continued in East Caprivi at low intensity.

1969

1969 saw little terrorism. On 22 July the SADF formed No. 1 Military Area with HQ in Rundu, taking over the defence of installations, and training local recruits. Infantry companies were deployed at Katima Mulilo, Rundu and Ondangwa, an armoured car troop at Katima. Police COIN teams remained in Caprivi. The UN declared South Africa's occupation of SWA illegal.

1970

The SWAPO Consultative Congress in Tanzania, in December 1969/January 1970, decided to mine SWA roads, using Soviet TM-46 and TMN-46 mines and some 'homemade' TNT mines.

1971

On 19 April the first mine was hit by a police van near

Katima Mulilo. SWAPO resumed political activity in Owambo. The International Court of Justice ruled that South Africa is governing SWA illegally.

1972


A SWAPO strike in January led to a state of emergency in northern SWA. Army elements deployed to support the Police. Zambian President Kaunda cut SWAPO transit permits from 21 to 7 days after pressure from South Africa. UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim visited South Africa to discuss SWA independence.

1973

SWAPO stepped up pressure on the people of Caprivi and Owambo, set some ambushes for the Police, and formed some groups of up to 50 men for forays into Caprivi. One attacked Singalamwe Police Station on 26 January. SWAPO enforced a boycott of Owambo elections (2.7% poll), and recruited 2,400 Owambos and 600 Caprivians by March 1974. The UN declared SWAPO the 'sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people'.

1974

The Army took over responsibility for border protection on 1 April. No. 1 Military Area was now divided into Sub-Areas: 1 Sub-Area—East Caprivi, 2 Sub-Area—Kavango, 3 Sub-Area—Owambo. Shortly after the 25 April Lisbon coup d'état, Portugal stopped operations in southern Angola. SWAPO now had easy access to Owambo and Kavango, and set up camps over the border in south-east Angola in May. The Army opened 4 Sub-Area in West Caprivi. From June, SWAPO appeared throughout northern SWA.





Old and new: mounted infantry collecting water from Buffel armoured vehicles that have just inserted a foot patrol in central Owambo, mid-1980.

1978

In March terrorists killed the Herero leader Clemens Kapuuo in Windhoek. SWAPO recruited 6,000 Owambos, reaching its peak strength of 16,000. On 24 February, 240 children were taken from a school on the border; 80 escaped. SWAPO worked in groups of 10–20, later forming groups of up to 100 for specific tasks, and engaged patrols in the immediate border area. 450 terrorists deployed in the Savate/Cubango River area to reactivate Kavango but were drawn away to fight UNITA. The intensified terrorism in Owambo led to the first major external operation against SWAPO's Angolan bases in May. *Operation Reindeer* inflicted heavy losses and terrorism declined. Katima Mulilo base was rocketed on 23 August. On 26 August the SADF hit SWAPO camps in Zambia. The UN adopted Resolution 435, providing for a UN-controlled transition to independence for SWA and for a UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). Elections for a Constitutive Assembly were boycotted by SWAPO.

1979

Terrorism again escalated in Owambo, including 245 mine incidents. In February 250 terrorists, the largest group until April 1990, shot at Nkongo base. Others mortared Elundu base. SWAPO made a major effort to 'mobilise the masses'. In November 1,000 terrorists moved to camps in south-west Zambia, a Front HQ and a Command Post were set up, and SWAPO became more active in Caprivi. It was clear that SWAPO planned to reactivate Caprivi. *Operation*

Safraan disrupted this plan, while *Operation Rekstok* hit SWAPO camps in south-east Angola. Zambia again forbade SWAPO operations, and SWAPO did not again make any serious attempts to reactivate Caprivi. CANU broke away from SWAPO.

Kaokoland saw a number of mines and murders along the border. Kavango was quiet. In Owambo the situation was not as happy: SWAPO was having some success 'mobilising the masses', and might go over to guerrilla operations. Talks between South Africa, the 'Western Five', the 'Frontline States' and SWAPO fail. A National Assembly is established in SWA.

1980

In January Special Unit terrorists infiltrated Kavango and south of Owambo. Others of the Special Unit attacked headmen and black policemen and soldiers in Owambo. A Detachment of the North-Western Front prepared an infiltration of Kaokoland; Northern and North-Eastern Front terrorists were to follow it; 700 others would infiltrate south in the confusion. In May terrorists shot at police bases and Ondangwa air base; 800 terrorists moved from Zambia to southern Angola for this operation. SWAPO's casualties rose to 90 a month, well above the recruiting rate, forcing them to consider new tactics. The Cubans trained a mechanised force to protect SWAPO camps. Another external operation, *Sceptic*, was carried out in June to pre-empt SWAPO, and inflicted some quite serious losses. SWAPO was, nevertheless, able to escalate its operations in west and central Owambo to some extent. Ruacana was rocketed in July; the SADF

responded with *Operation Klipkop*. 1980 was a turning point: Terrorism in Owambo peaked at 1,175 incidents, but SWAPO losses were 1,447, more than it could absorb. The conflict began to shift from Owambo to southern Angola, causing SWAPO to lose its contact with the Owambo population. The National Assembly adopted the constitution drawn up by the Turnhalle Conference. The SWA Territory Force and the SWA Police were formed.

1981

Smaller operations followed to mop up SWAPO in southern Angola. SWAPO then rebuilt its stockpiles in southern Angola and fighting intensified; 277 terrorists were killed in July alone. Another 'external' followed: *Protea*, disrupting SWAPO operations till year end. Terrorism declined to 1,052 incidents; SWAPO lost 1,494 killed. FAPLA withdrew from the border area, robbing SWAPO of protection and access to its logistics; SWAPO followed. Army patrols in southern Angola caught many terrorists as they moved to the border. Intelligence gained in *Protea* led to *Operation Daisy* against SWAPO camps deep inside Angola. UN-sponsored talks in Geneva broke down over South African complaints of UN bias in favour of SWAPO.

1982

After *Protea* and *Daisy*, terrorism fell to 756 incidents in 1982; SWAPO losses remained high at 1,286. SWAPO's recruiting suffered; and the growing efficiency of Koevoet, the Police COIN Unit, further hampered SWAPO terrorism. Operations against SWAPO in Angola continued. SWAPO's operations had become logistically complex as it was pushed deeper into Angola. Temporary forward camps were



The funeral of Headman Shikongo, killed early in 1980 defending his home against a group of SWAPO. In the centre foreground is a typical Special Constable

of the SWAPOL Protection Force – see Plate D2. He wears mixed sand and olive uniform and '73 pattern skeleton webbing, and carries a G-3 rifle.

set up to brief and equip terrorists, and were closed once they had set off. Stepped-up patrolling soon began locating these very vulnerable camps; one was cleared in *Operation Super*. Another operation—*Mebos*—struck the SWAPO command and control system. 1982 saw only 156 terrorist incidents. 1,286 terrorists were killed, many in Angola. South Africa endorsed a modified Resolution 435.

1983

1983 followed the pattern of 1982. *Operation Askari* in December struck at SWAPO concentrations before they could launch the annual infiltration; it brought several clashes with FAPLA. These led to talks between South Africa and Angola in Lusaka to seek disengagement. The National Assembly dissolved itself after South Africa refused to go ahead with unilateral independence. A Multi-Party Conference was formed to continue discussions.

1984

In the terms of the Lusaka Accord, the SADF



Civilians bore the brunt of SWAPO's mine-laying; the security forces used protected vehicles and

often drove off-road. Two local civilians died and four were injured in this blast on 2 February 1986.



Sapper with a late-model mine-detector, displaying the chest pouches of the '82 pattern webbing, and a slung R-4.



withdrew from south Angola and FAPLA undertook to keep SWAPO out of the border area; a Joint Monitoring Commission (SADF/FAPLA) was to oversee this. 1984 was bad for SWAPO—*Askari* caused heavy losses and the SADF JMC patrols made southern Angola dangerous. By year's end there were only 30 terrorists in Owambo, 23 in Kavango and almost none in Kaokoland. Only 7 had been able to go south of Owambo and had all been killed. An infiltration through Botswana to avoid the JMC failed, all of the terrorists being killed or captured. SWAPO trained strength at year end stood at 8,500: 3,400 were fighting UNITA, 1,200 were defending the HQ and main camps, 600 were in sub-headquarters, 600 in Zambia, and 1,200 in administration and logistics. Only 1,500 were available for infiltration into SWA, including 750 of the special unit.

1985

By January the JMC was quite clearly not working. SWAPO infiltration continued, and increased as the rainy season began. Before the JMC, the terrorists faced patrols deep inside Angola; now they were safe except near the border. Terrorism intensified rapidly: mines again claimed victims, bombs hit garages, shops and businesses in Owambo. In March, 'Typhoon' infiltrated 75 men to re-establish SWAPO's political presence; as specialists, they were not adept in the field and 35 had been killed by month end. Others entered Kavango, where there were now only 15 terrorists, and also died. Terrorism escalated further. *Operation Boswilger* struck just over the border, and brought an immediate decline in terrorism. 482 terrorists had been killed and some captured by late August. SWAPO now had 40 in Owambo: 10 in the west, 15 each in central and east Owambo, none in Kaokoland and Kavango. Urban terrorism failed when most of the terrorists were arrested. A Transitional Government of National Unity was formed at the request of the MPC, and the Administrator-General replaced by a Governor-General with reduced powers.

1986

The conflict settled back into its earlier pattern: in June/July SWAPO withdrew from Owambo for the dry season; from August to November they concentrated on retraining and re-equipping the Detachments, and small groups infiltrated on low-risk tasks. In December/January the Army deployed into southern Angola on the SWAPO infiltration routes. From February to May there would be contacts in southern Angola and Owambo. The 1985/86 infiltration was delayed, partly by late rains. Mid-

February saw the first major clashes: 37 terrorists died in one contact with Koevoet in east Owambo on 14 February. By 23 February 116 had been killed. SWAPO decided that a major success was needed. A special group of 55 terrorists was ordered to capture a white policeman and a Casspir APC. They crept up to Onhangwena Police base during the night of 6 May, but were seen; 2 were killed and 2 captured, and 13 were killed during the follow-up. On 21 May a large terrorist group ambushed two Romeo Mike teams in southern Angola, losing 56 killed. FAPLA did no better in a clash on 22 May, 35km from Xangongo: it lost 53 killed and 5 wounded. By November SWAPO had lost 606 killed. SWAPO now had 8,350 men: 2,700 were fighting UNITA, 2,700 defending major bases, 1,050 at headquarters, 500 defending camps in southern Angola, and 400 in specialist elements. 1,000 were available for infiltration into Owambo. In March the SA President had announced 1 August as the date for implementing Resolution 435, on condition that Cuban forces were withdrawn from Angola. This offer was retracted in June in the face of intensified terrorism and no sign that Cuba would agree.

1987

The year opened violently: 100 terrorists and 11 members of the security forces had died by 22 January. FAPLA began to back up SWAPO. Pursuing Romeo Mike teams were fired on by FAPLA near Mongua on 25 January; 72 SWAPO and 48 FAPLA died. 'Typhoon' again took heavy losses in Owambo. Another clash with FAPLA came on 14 June, when they engaged Romeo Mike teams near Anhanca—50 FAPLA and 20 SWAPO died. In July Romeo Mike teams tracking SWAPO terrorists near Dova found

themselves pursuing more than 120. Both sides brought in more men, and 190 FAPLA and SWAPO died. In August, 32 Battalion and 61 Mechanised Battalion group deployed to south-east Angola to support UNITA—*Operation Modular*. There were some small follow-up operations in September. On 31 October SWAPO's Central Front forward HQ, 35km north of Cassinga, was hit in *Operation Firewood*: 150 SWAPO were killed. Activity in Owambo began to slow down as SWAPO prepared for the new rainy season.

1988

The fighting in south-east Angola continued, the South Africans pushing FAPLA off the Chaminga highlands in *Operation Hooper*. Terrorism in Owambo escalated. Oshakati was rocketed on 13 January. The SAAF hit SWAPO's Western Regional HQ on the 15th and in Xangongo on 4 February. A bomb in an Oshakati bank killed 20 and injured 44 on 19 February. Eight Mirages hit the Tobias Hainyeko Training Centre and a transit camp at Lubango, and five Impalas and artillery hit SWAPO in Ongiva on the 20th. On 3 May South African, Cuban and Angolan diplomats met in London to discuss disengagement.

The Cubans meanwhile speeded up deploying their 50th division in south-west Angola. This had a dual purpose: it demonstrated solidarity with Angola after the fiasco in the south-east, while being far enough away from major South African forces not to risk a clash; and it strengthened SWAPO's hand by making a major external operation unlikely. South Africa was as keen to settle as were Cuba and Angola, and would hardly risk a clash that might hazard negotiations. The



A wide range of mine-protected vehicles were developed including several on light truck chassis as 'utility' transport; one was this Rheebock, widely used by the Police and civil government departments.

SADF responded with a simulated deployment (10 Division) in north-west SWA. The Cubans also formed composite units with SWAPO at Cahama, Mongua, Mupa and Capira, handling support functions, escorting the terrorists to the border and covering their withdrawal. They also covered the forward deployment of the SWAPO Front HQs to Cuvelai, then to Xangongo (Western), Mongua (Central) and Ongiva (Eastern). SWAPO became more aggressive, and both Cuban and FAPLA forces began to engage security forces pursuing terrorists withdrawing into Angola.

After almost four months of escalating terrorism and Cuban/Angolan delays at the negotiations, the SADF moved a small force of armour and artillery over the Cunene. On 26 June they shelled positions around Techipa, inflicting quite heavy casualties. On 27 June a Cuban/FAPLA force advanced from Techipa towards the South Africans, withdrawing after a running battle against Olifant MBTs and some Ratel-90s. A little later eight MiG-23s attacked the Calueque dam, damaging the main water pipe to Owambo, destroying a Buffel APC and killing 11 men; one MiG was damaged and did not make it home. The main South African force meanwhile crossed back to SWA. These were the last major clashes—both sides having made their point, the negotiations began to show results. A disengagement agreement was signed on 22 August; the last South African troops withdrew from Angola on the 31st; and the Cubans began to pull back behind a line from

Ruacana through Chitido and Ongiva to the Lomba. A Joint Military Monitoring Commission (JMMC) of SADF, Cuban and FAPLA officers monitored the process. Angola and Cuba agreed to prevent SWAPO infiltration but, as in 1984/85, did not do so effectively. By mid-October terrorism had increased markedly, and 277 terrorists had entered Owambo since 1 September. They were also very active and aggressive, knowing that they could no longer be pursued into Angola. On 22 December the South African, Cuban and Angolan Foreign Ministers reached agreement on a settlement providing for a Cuban withdrawal from Angola and UN-supervised independence for SWA in terms of Resolution 435. 1989

By January there were 3,000–4,000 terrorists near the border. SWAPO had deployed its Command Post near Peu Peu, the Western Front HQ north of Peu Peu, and the Central Front HQ in the town. The negotiations between South Africa, Cuba and Angola, however, brought a settlement before SWAPO could turn its newly improved situation to lasting military advantage. By March terrorism was drastically down under pressure from Angola and Cuba, who did not want anything done that might allow South Africa to back out.

The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) military commander, General Prem Chand, arrived on 22 February, beginning the UN-supervised SWA independence process. UNTAG's military force had been reduced from a planned 7,500 men to 4,650 to



◀ One of the earliest mine-protection APCs was the Hippo, based on the Bedford 4-ton chassis; these remained in service in second-line roles after the Buffel and Casspir replaced them as front-line APCs.

► The Buffel mine-protected APC, developed using a Unimog chassis; although intended purely as personnel transport it was used as a fighting vehicle on many occasions. The troop compartment has ten seats, back to back, with full harness; the hinged sideplates can be dropped for quick exits; and the V-shaped hull gives protection against even multiple anti-tank mines.

cut costs, and this wrangle had delayed its deployment. 2,000 civilians and 360 police were also to be deployed, the latter eventually increasing to 1,000. The first UNTAG troops arrived in Windhoek on 10 March. The UN Special Representative for SWA/N, Mr Martti Ahtisaari, arrived in Windhoek on 31 March, just in time to see SWAPO almost derail the entire process by launching its largest-ever infiltration.

The first terrorists entered Owambo during the night 31 March/1 April, two groups of 100 and 90 near Ruacana, and two of 70 and 50 near Eenhana. The first contact came on 1 April when a police patrol was ambushed by 200 terrorists. That night two groups of 150 and 100 crossed east of Ruacana, and two of 50 near Nkongo. It was clear that the Police could not handle the situation alone. After discussions between South Africa, UNTAG and the UN Secretary-General, it was agreed that the 1,500 SA combat troops still in Owambo would deploy to support the 2,000 SWA Police in the area, and that three SWATF battalions would be reactivated. More terrorists crossed during the next two nights, bringing the total to 1,200. By 6 April, 1,500 terrorists had entered SWA. 253 terrorists and 26 soldiers and policemen had died. Another 600–750 terrorists were just north of the border, and 2,350 elsewhere in

southern Angola. Fighting spread to Kaokoland and east Owambo. By 8 April there were 1,900 terrorists in SWA, and 200 at Sesheke in south-west Zambia.

The fighting now began to wind down as SWAPO accepted that the gamble had failed, agreeing to recall their men. UNTAG had been unable to react because it was running three weeks late, with only 9 of 300 police observers in place, and only some 100 military observers in the country. South Africa, Cuba and Angola meanwhile agreed that all terrorists in SWA were to report to UNTAG assembly points by 15 April, to be disarmed and taken to north of the 16th Parallel. By 12 April, Nujoma had ordered his men back to Angola. Only a few reported to UNTAG, most crossing directly to Angola. The deadline was extended, the Army and Police only patrolling again after 29 April. SWAPO's gamble cost it more than 314 killed and 42 captured; 27 policemen and soldiers had died. The political process continued; UNTAG completed its deployment and South Africa began drawing its forces down to be at 1,500 by election day. The SWATF stood down, and the SWAPOL COIN Unit disbanded. The election in November passed peacefully, producing a massive SWAPO vote in Owambo, and victory for other parties in most of the rest of the country.



THE SECURITY FORCES

The South African Defence Force

The first counter-insurgency operations were carried out by COIN units of the SA Police, controlled by the Security Branch Head Office in Pretoria. Ordinary policing in northern SWA fell under District Headquarters that reported to the SWA Divisional HQ of the SAP in Windhoek. This organisation remained almost unchanged until the end of the conflict, except that the SWA Division of the SAP became independent in 1980 as the SWA Police.

The only Army units in SWA during the early years were Citizen Force (CF) units and Commandos (territorial defence), under SWA Command. There was also a training unit, 2 SA Infantry Battalion, in the South African enclave of Walvis Bay.

The SADF operational involvement in northern SWA began on 6 May 1968, when the SAAF established No. 1 Air Component at Rundu to support the Police COIN units with light aircraft, Alouette IIIs and Dakotas. On 22 July 1969 the Army established No. 1 Military Area, with HQ at Rundu, to support the Police and train local recruits. It had three infantry companies at Rundu, Katima Mulilo and Ondangwa, and an armoured car troop at Katima Mulilo.

On 1 April 1974, the SADF took over SWA border security from the SAP. 1 Military Area was divided into four Sub-Areas, covering Kaokoland, Owambo, Kavango and Caprivi. A fifth Sub-Area opened in August 1975, to protect the Ruacana/Caluque hydro-electric scheme. When South Africa became involved in the Angolan civil war, two other Military Areas were opened to control operations in support of UNITA and the FNLA. When *Operation Savannah* ended, two Military Areas controlled operations in northern SWA: No. 1 covering Kavango and No. 2 covering Owambo and Kaokoland. In 1979 the Operational Area was divided into three Sectors—10, 20, 70—under SA Army command. Four Sectors—30, 40, 50, 60—covered the rest of SWA, commanded by SWATF officers from 1980.

Sector 10

Headquarters: Oshakati.

Forces: Four modular battalions—51 at Ruacana, 52 at Oshakati,

53 at Ondangwa, 54 at Eenhana; 61 Mechanised Battalion Group at Omathiya; 101 and 102 Battalions SWATF at Ondangwa and Opuwa; 25 Engineer Squadron at Oshakati; a training unit at Oshivelo; and 5 Maintenance Unit at Ondangwa.

Other Forces: The SAAF had its main base at Ondangwa, with Impala Mk II light attack aircraft, Alouette III gunships, Pumas, Bosbok FAC aircraft, Kudu utility aircraft, and Dakotas. The Special Forces had a base inside the air base perimeter. The Medical Service had a surgical hospital at Ondangwa. The main Police COIN Unit HQ was at Oshakati, with a sub-IHQ at Opuwa.

Sector 20

Headquarters: Rundu.

Forces: 55 Bn. at Nepara; 32 Bn. at Buffalo; 201, 202 and 203 Bns. SWATF at Omega, Rundu, and Mangeti.



Other Forces: SAAF airbase at Rundu; Impala Mk IIs, helicopters and light aircraft. The Special Forces had several bases in this sector. The Medical Service and the Police had their regional HQs, and a Police COIN Unit sub-IHQ at Rundu.

Sector 70

Headquarters: Mpacha.

Forces: 701 Bn. SWATF at Mpacha, with attached SWATF armoured car squadron and SWATF artillery battery, and SA Navy Marine Company for river patrols.

Other Forces: SAAF airbase at Mpacha; Impala Mk IIs, helicopters and light aircraft. The Medical Service and the Police had their regional HQs at Mpacha and Katima Mulilo.



► A foot patrol being dropped off by Buffels.

Major Units

The Modular Battalions

The main units involved in internal operations were the 'modular battalions'. 51, 52, 53 and 54 were formed in 1976; 55 Bn. was formed as the 'Western Area Battalion' of 1 Military Area to counter the infiltration into Kavango, and became 55 Bn. in November 1986.

Each battalion had a small core of Permanent Force (PF) officers and NCOs on 2- to 4-year tours, and national service men (NSM) in the second year of service. Sub-units were attached according to the varying demands of the situation, hence 'modular'. The rainy season, for instance, brought reinforcements to meet the demands of the annual infiltration. Usually each battalion fielded several infantry companies, an armoured car squadron (Fland-90s and -60s), and an engineer troop. These elements were drawn from SA Army training and CF units, and from SWATF regional, training and Reaction Force units. Trackers, 'mounties', motorcyclists, and dog handlers were also attached as needed.

The infantry companies generally occupied company bases, and had responsibility for a particular part of the battalion's area. Most of them were 'modular companies' of five rifle platoons and attached trackers, interpreters, etc.; an armoured car troop and

other elements were attached as needed. The infantry had Buffel mine-protected APCs for area patrols and to insert foot patrols. 81mm mortars and various machine guns, including a number of old Vickers MMGs, were used for base defence. Light weapons included the 7.62mm R-1 or 5.56mm R-4 rifles, and rebored Bren LMGs; 40mm grenade launchers, 60mm mortars and sniping rifles, shotguns and sub-machine guns.

The main responsibility of the modular battalions was to secure their assigned areas. They employed cordon and search operations and sweeps, intensive foot and vehicle patrolling, road patrols, standing patrols and road checkpoints, swept the roads for mines, and protected roadworks and water affairs teams in their area. They escorted officials paying pensions (the 'pension convoys'), medical and veterinary teams, provided basic medical assistance to local civilians and helped them in other ways. They also took part in 'externals' and carried out independent 'shallow externals'.

61 Mechanised Battalion Group

Formed in 1979 on the basis of Combat Group Juliet, the mechanised force of *Operation Reindeer*. It was the core of most major external operations, and had a key part in defeating the 1987/88 FAPLA offensive against UNITA. Organisation varied for a time before stabilising at two mechanised infantry companies (each

► A Ratel ICV fitted as a command vehicle during Operation 'Sceptic' in June 1980.



3 × 4 Ratel-20s); an armoured car squadron (3 × 4 Ratel-90s); a tank squadron (3 × 3 Olifant MBTs); and an artillery battery (8 × 155mm G-5 and 8 × 120mm M-5 mortars [alternative equipment]). Support elements included anti-tank platoon (3 sections of 2 Ratel-90s and 2 ATGW teams), a mortar platoon (12 × Ratel-81s), an anti-aircraft troop (12 × Ystervark SP 20mm) and engineer, signals, medical and technical elements. Like the modular battalions, 61 Mech had a PF/NSM core and was assigned complete sub-units from various armour and infantry training units.

32 Battalion

Formed in 1976 from FNI/A troops cut off by the MPLA victory; it grew into the premier light infantry battalion of the SA Army, with an excellent combat record. 32 Bn. had five rifle companies, an anti-tank squadron (Ratel-90s), a support company with 81mm mortars, 106mm recoilless guns and 14.5mm machine guns on Unimogs, and an anti-aircraft troop with 12 Ystervark 20mm SPs. It used Buffel and Casspir APCs, although it frequently operated on foot after helicopter insertion. At first officers and NCOs were all South Africans, but later the number of black NCOs and junior officers grew appreciably. 32 Bn. specialised in reconnaissance and search and engage operations in southern Angola. Often quite small elements would be deployed in Angola for five weeks or more to search out SWAPO camps. Once a camp was found, additional troops would be brought in to attack it or, if too well-defended for 32 to deal with alone, 61 Mech or other units would be brought in.

1 Parachute Battalion

Formed in 1961, its first action as a unit came in 1975–76 during *Operation Savannah*. It took part in many externals: *Operation Reindeer* saw them jump at Cassinga, 250km inside Angola; *Sceptic* saw six companies deployed inside Angola simultaneously. There was also a company-strength para reaction force at Ondangwa AFB for many years. Two CF battalions—2 and 3 Para—were formed in 1971 and 1977, and took part in several externals; they also deployed companies at Ondangwa. 44 Parachute Brigade was formed in 1978 with these battalions, a light artillery regiment

(120mm mortars) and an anti-tank company. A standing unit, 14 Parachute Battalion Group, was formed in 1988 and saw operational service during the 1989 SWAPO infiltration. The Paras generally used Pumas for insertion and extraction, but did jump several times.

Marines

The SA Navy deployed a Marine company to the Operational Area on a rotation basis from 1981 until the end of the conflict. First based at Oshakati, the Marines later took responsibility for a company area in Caprivi under command of 701 Battalion. Working from Wenela, they ran routine COIN operations and river patrols. In the latter role they used wooden patrol boats towing small inflatables with which a patrol could be put ashore quickly. The Marines were organised as a rifle company, using Army equipment and webbing, and wearing nutria field dress—albeit with naval rank insignia. Their standard rifle was the G-3.

SA Air Force

Beginning with No. 1 Air Component in 1968, the SAAF was involved from beginning to end. It had airbases at Ondangwa, Ruacana, Rundu and Mpacha; there were air strips at many Army bases, and helicopter landing areas at the others.

The most important aircraft were the Puma, the Alouette III and the Impala Mk II; small numbers of each type were based in the Operational Area. Most pilots and ground crew were seconded from squadrons in South Africa, some on long tours. Impala Mk II light attack aircraft flew most of the close air support sorties during external operations, building an outstanding operational record in the face of some quite modern air-defence systems including 23mm ZU-23-2 and 20mm M-55s, 14.5mm ZPU-1s and other machine guns, and various SAMs: SA-7, SA-9, SA-3 in the early days; later also SA-6, SA-8, SA-13 and man-portable SA-14s and SA-16s. They also provided effective night support despite their lack of electronics. Apart from their 30mm cannon, they mainly used 68mm rockets and 120kg HE and pre-fragmented bombs. They also flew photo-reconnaissance using a camera pod.



Puma and (background) Alouette helicopters at Chitido during Operation 'Klipkop', 1980. The Puma crew, with R-4s, provide their own security; they wear flying overalls, and the man on the left typically wears velskoene instead of boots.

The Pumas were the main troop, casevac and resupply aircraft, supporting internal and external operations. Alouette IIIs armed with side-firing 20mm cannon supported any patrols, Fighting Groups and Romeo Mike teams in contact or following up a spoor. The gunship pilots sometimes assumed tactical control when the bush was too thick for the commander on the ground to form a clear picture. The commander of the paratroop reaction force usually flew in one of the gunships. Some Alouette IIIs were armed with single 12.7mm or twin 7.62mm machine-guns and were used in a command role. Super Frelons saw some service, but were not comfortable under the very 'hot and high' conditions.

Mirages, Buccaneers and Canberras supported the major external operations. The Mirages and, to a lesser extent, the Buccaneers flew both CAS and strike missions, while the Canberras operated as medium-level bombers. Weapons used included 120kg and 250kg pre-fragmented and 450kg HE bombs, the spherical 'Alpha Bomb', and 68mm rockets. Some Mirages were also based at Ondangwa from time to time in the air-defence role. Two MiG-21s were downed by Mirage F-1CZs during externals. Canberras also flew long-range reconnaissance, usually with a Mirage escort. Mirage III RZs and R2Zs flew reconnaissance in high-threat areas.

The Bosbok had many roles: visual reconnaissance in support of patrols, cordon-and-search operations and sweeps, in reaction to contacts or incidents, and along the cut lines; forward air controller; artillery spotter; road and power line patrols; night spotter, watching for possible mining activity on the tar roads, for vehicle movement, and in reaction to contacts or incidents; night air base security; navigation support for ground forces; and 'telstar' communications relay. The Kudu was used in the light transport, liaison and casevac/medevac roles, for pamphlet drops and 'ground-shout' work, and in place of the Bosbok. C-130 Hercules and C-160 Transalls flew regular transport missions from South Africa to the Grootfontein transit base and to the major bases in the Operational Area. C-160s and Dakotas also flew regular services within the Operational Area and from Grootfontein. One Dakota was armed with a 20mm cannon in the door and known as 'Dragon Dak'.

The South-West Africa Territory Force (SWATF)

The SWATF was established on 1 August 1980 to form the basis for future SWA armed forces, around existing regional, CF and



Mirage F-1AZ pilot of No.1 Sqn. SAAF at Grootfontein during the 1987-88 operations in support of UNITA. No.1 Sqn. flew a total of 683 sorties, averaging eight aircraft per mission, over 191 days;

they delivered 3,068 bombs, and lost one Mirage shot down and one crashed. During the same campaign No.24 Sqn. deployed four Buccaneers, which flew 99 sorties and dropped 701 bombs.

Commando units. By 1989 the SWATF provided some 70% of the ground forces deployed against SWAPO. Its standing force included seven regional light infantry battalions: 101 Bn. in Owambo, 102 in Kaokoland, 201 (Bushman) and 202 in Kavango, 701 in East Caprivi, 203 in Bushmanland, and 301 in Sector 30.

Its 'Reaction Force' (CF) was 91 Brigade, comprising an armoured car regiment (Eland-90), two infantry battalions (Ratel/Buffel), an artillery regiment (5.5in.), and the usual supporting elements. Another standing infantry battalion, 911 Bn., was a 'swing force' capable of both COIN operations and conventional infantry operations as a part of the brigade. The SWATF also had special forces and parachute elements, and a specialised tracking/mounted infantry unit. A CF light aircraft squadron flew communications and spotter missions. The SWA Military School at



Men of 32 Bn., identified by the fact that they alone in the SADF wear camouflage uniform, board a Puma for a ride to their patrol area in 1984; the orange cross on the helicopter shows its assignment to the Joint Monitoring Commission.



SAF Impala Mk.IIs provided the bulk of close air support during the conflict, using mainly 68mm rockets and 120 kg bombs. This Impala is parked in the netted pens at Ondangwa in 1985. Though elderly, the Impala is a robust ground-attack machine; the first sign that the enemy had operational SA-9 SAMs came when an Impala returned from a photo-recce mission with a complete SA-9 warhead lodged in its tail.

Okahandja offered junior leader training, advanced training being in South Africa. While the regional units handled their own basic and individual training, national service training was carried out by 2 SAI in Walvis Bay for the SWATF.

These forces were complemented by a regional counter-insurgency force—Area Force—of 26 Area Force Units organised to meet their particular responsibilities, and under the command of four Sectors: 30 (HQ at Otjiwarongo), 40 (Windhoek), 50 (Gobabis) and 60 (Keetmanshoop).

101 Battalion

Shared the brunt of the operations in Owambo with Koevoet, and also took part in many external operations. It was formed in 1974 as the company-strength 1 Owambo Bn., with a home guard role. From 1976 it was expanded to battalion strength and renamed 35 Bn. in 1978. When the Sectors were formed in 1979 it was renamed 101 Bn. It recruited exclusively within Owambo. Recruits were initially given only sufficient training for the home guard role but this changed drastically after 1978: the training programme changed to 12 months of intensive infantry training with the emphasis on rural counter-insurgency operations. Other subjects included driving, communications and 'buddy aid'. Later training covered various heavy weapons. Officers and NCOs were drawn from SA Army units, but a junior leader training programme soon began to provide Owambo NCOs and junior officers: by 1989 a captain, 7 lieutenants, a sergeant-major, 5 staff-sergeants and 260 corporals.

Until 1980 the men were employed in small teams attached to SA Army units as trackers and interpreters. In 1981 it was decided to convert 101 to a light infantry battalion. In 1983/4 700 men were recruited and trained, and thereafter it had an annual intake, building up to around 2,500 men by 1989. 101 Bn. 'turned' many of the SWAPO terrorists that it captured: by 1989 some 35% of its strength was made up of 'turned ters'.

In 1984 101 Bn. took on the Police's mechanised tracking concept and developed it to suit Army operations. Two Reaction Force companies (901/903 Special Service Companies) were formed for this purpose. Their platoons were soon known as 'Romeo Mike' teams from the Afrikaans 'Reaksiemag'. A typical Romeo Mike team consisted of two officers and 40 men with four Casspirs and a Samil 50 Kwéviel mine-protected supply truck. Each company had three teams. From 1985, 101 Bn's sub-units fought under its command rather than detached to other units. Another two Romeo

Mike companies (902/904) and a Reconnaissance Wing were formed, giving 101 a Reaction Force of four Romeo Mike companies and the Reconnaissance Wing. This element concentrated mainly on external operations and hot pursuit. An Internal Force of two companies manned four small bases, and handled protection and civic action work. A support company had anti-tank, mortar, tracker, interpreter, engineer and medical platoons.

From 1985, 101 Bn. and Koevoet handled the bulk of mobile and reaction operations inside Owambo and cross-border pursuits. 101 also ran independent external operations, and took part in others; in 1987 it took part in the operations to stop the FAPIA offensive against Jamba.

101 Bn's Romeo Mike Teams were exceptionally successful. Two teams were ambushed by 60 SWAPO during an external in 1986, killing 58 of the ambushers for the loss of two men wounded. In 1987 two teams killed 190 out of 250 SWAPO for the loss of two wounded; these enemy casualties were confirmed from intercepts. Between 1977 and 1988, 101 averaged 200 contacts a year and at times had troops in Angola for six months at a time. It lost 85 men killed.

102 Battalion

This unit began life in 1978 as the Kaokoland Company, with only 48 men. After a SWAPO infiltration in 1979 it was decided to expand it into 37 Bn., later renamed 102 Bn. By 1989 it had 1,100 men in four rifle companies at Opuwo, Okongwati and Ehoriba. One company took part in *Operation Protea* in 1981; and elements were involved in several smaller externals and in *Operation Askari* in 1983, several operations in 1984 and 1986, and *Operation Excite* in 1988. The battalion lost 36 men killed.

201 Battalion

Formed 1974 with an infantry company of Portuguese and Bushman refugees from Angola, and another of Caprivi Bushmen formed in 1975. They took part in *Operation Savannah* as Combat Group Alpha. They were then formed into 31 Bn. in 1976. During 1977 and 1978, men of 31 Bn. served as trackers in Owambo, and others formed reconnaissance teams with 1 Reconnaissance Commando. Renamed 201 Bn. in 1979, it grew to five rifle companies and a reconnaissance wing. Considerable effort also went into the welfare of the Bushman community that grew up around it. 201 Bn. took part in many externals, and had a company based in Owambo on rotation.

202 Battalion

Formed 1975 by the Police as a guard force for border posts, and transferred to the Army as 1 Kavango Battalion; renamed 34 Bn. in 1978 and 202 Bn. in 1980. It deployed elements to Owambo in 1979, and then in Kavango between 1980 and 1985 to counter SWAPO attempts to activate the region. This threat fell away after 1985, and companies again deployed to Owambo. Elements took part in several externals. The first Kavango officer was commissioned in 1980. By 1989, 202 Bn. had 1,600 men in four rifle companies. All section leaders, platoon sergeants and company sergeants-major were Kavangos, as were a major and six lieutenants. An armoured car squadron manned by SWATF NSM was attached.

203 Battalion

Formed 1978 as 36 Bn. in Bushmanland; renamed 203 Bn. in 1980. It concentrated on local security, and helping its men and their extended families adapt to the modern economy. It deployed companies to 54, 55 and 102 Bns. on rotation, and on the border with Botswana. Elements took part in externals. In 1989 the battalion had a strength of 500.

701 Battalion

Formed 1977 as 33 Bn.; renamed 701 Bn. in 1980. It took part in operations into Zambia, and from 1978 deployed companies to Kavango, Kaokoland and Owambo. From 1983 it had a company D—of Marines attached. In 1989 it had 900 men in three rifle companies and a support company. Seven officers and all NCOs up to and including the staff-sergeants were Caprivians.

911 Battalion

Formed 1977 as 41 Bn., recruiting throughout the territory rather than on a regional basis; renamed 911 Bn. in 1980 as part of 91 Brigade. It transferred back to Sector 40 in 1987. 911 Bn. deployed companies to Owambo from 1980, and took part in several externals. From 1984 one company was permanently deployed to 51 Bn.



▲ The new 'plastic' helmet with its unusual cloth cover complete with a 'cap peak'; and the '82 pattern load-carrying vest. Note corporal's chevrons on a brassard, and slung R-5 with butt folded. Compare with Plate A4.



◀ Eland-90 and Eland-60 armoured cars – the local designations of the French Panhard range – at Okatope company base in central Owambo, 1980. Both types were used for area patrols and convoy escort; and the Eland-90 also saw extensive service during 'externals', dealing with T-34/85s, T-54s and bunkers.

on rotation. From 1988 it was involved in training national servicemen.

301 Battalion

Formed 1984 out of the 'Northern Border Company' that had been formed in 1980 under control of 61 Mech. It deployed elements to 51 Bn. and for *Operation Modular*.

1 SWA Specialist Unit

Known as 'Swaspes' (pronounced 'Swaspess') from the Afrikaans spelling 'Spesialiste', this unit grew out of 101 Specialist Unit, formed at Oshivelo in 1977 to centralise reaction force elements. It combined the paratroopers of 1 Para based at Ondangwa with dog handlers, trackers and mounted infantry. A motorcycle platoon was attached from South Africa. Once trained, the unit deployed at Nkongo under command of 54 Bn. for its first operational tour. This went exceptionally well, the unit averaging almost ten contacts a week. The key to its success lay in combining infantry with the skills of the trackers, the abilities of the dogs, and the mobility of horses, motorcycles and paratroopers. By March 1978 the unit began to expand, and moved to Oshivelo. It now had two companies of 'Mounties', two platoons of trackers and two of motorcyclists, as well as 60 dogs. The paras remained at Ondangwa. The unit was renamed 1 SWA Specialist Unit. By 1982 it had transferred to the SWATF, and had a purpose-built base at Otavi. Elements took part in most major internal and external operations and supported the modular battalions. In 1984 a full-time company of black troops was formed. Their first operational employment was with 203 Bn. in Bushmanland in 1985, operating in two reaction force teams using Buffel APCs. This company then saw regular employment in that role in various parts of the Operational Area. In 1989 the unit had two national service companies and one full-time company. By then most of its troops had reverted to either

tracking or motorcycle work, although horses were again in use after a period of neglect.

2 SWA Specialist Unit

Formed in 1987 out of the parachute company of Regiment Erongo (912 Bn.)—which became 1 SWA Parachute Company in 1980—and 1 SWA Reconnaissance Regiment (formed 1982). It took part in various external operations.

The Police

The South African Police were the first element of the security forces involved in the conflict. Their early COIN units deployed and operated as light infantry platoons. When the SADF took over responsibility for the SWA border, the SAP withdrew their COIN units, leaving only Uniform Branch and CID personnel on normal police duties, and elements of the Security Branch. The Police returned to counter-insurgency in 1979 with *Operation K*; they then also took over the home guard again. A small number of COIN platoons again deployed for a time, but this soon fell away and the effort concentrated on Koevoet. The Railways Police deployed some men to protect road convoys moving from the Tsumeb and Grootfontein railheads up into the Operational Area.

Koevoet: The Police Counter-Insurgency Unit

Koevoet—originally 'Operation K'—was a mobile COIN unit that grew out of a Security Branch operation intended to develop into a 'pseudo operation' much like the Selous Scouts. It was formed in 1979, with ten South African policemen and 64 locally-trained special constables. The concept was primarily aimed at gathering intelligence, which would then be followed-up and exploited by a suitable reaction force. That role was filled by Reconnaissance Regiment elements, but that arrangement was not swift enough to satisfy the Police. Operation K had soon formed its



The Casspir mine-protected APC was developed for the Police, but was also used extensively by SWATF units. Heavier and more powerful than the Buffel, it has excellent mobility in sand and bush. It has 12 inward-facing seats, with firing ports along the hull sides, and powerful rear doors. Armament varied; this one has a twin .50 cal./7.62mm mounting, though two 7.62s were also standard; later examples had another 7.62 mounted through the screen next to the driver, and 'field fits' by individual unit commanders included cannon, grenade-launchers and mortars. Camouflage suits and canvas boots identify this crew as 'Koevoet'.



'Koevoet' Special Constables in their more typical guise – very casual; see Plate C. This Casspir is

armed with twin MG-4s, a 7.62mm version of the .30 cal. Browning.

own reaction force, with vehicles obtained in some unorthodox ways. Having its own reaction force worked well: 36 contacts in 90 days.

The concept was developed further and, by the mid-1980s, Koevoet had three units covering Kaokoland, Owambo and Kavango under the overall command of its headquarters at Oshakati. The units had a varying number of Fighting Groups under their command, as well as a Special Investigation Team to provide intelligence back-up and run clandestine operations. The Fighting Group consisted of 40/50 men, four Casspir APCs, a Blesbok supply truck and, when needed, a Duiker diesel bowser. Groups were sometimes deployed together for a particular operation, but more usually formed up from their individual patrols when they heard activity on the radio. The group leaders were generally officers or NCOs of the Security Branch, their 'car commanders' SB

'Koevoet' trackers of the SWAPO-COIN unit run on a 'warm' spoor during a SWAPO 'special unit' infiltration south of Owambo; their ability to follow tracks at speed, while the heavily-armed Casspirs followed them ready to give instant and devastating fire support, was a factor in their many successes. It was unusual for the Owambo trackers to wear these full camouflage suits in the field; note that they wear no webbing, except for one '67 pattern pouch on the right-hand man's belt—all their kit was left in the vehicle. Two carry G-3s, the leading man an R-4 or R-5.



constables. The special constables—'buddies'—were recruited and trained in Owambo, basically as light infantry. Many captured terrorists were 'turned' and joined Koevoet, improving its effectiveness.

The main Oshakati HQ monitored the entire Operational Area and deployed Fighting Groups among its units as the situation suggested. As far as possible, however, groups were not deployed outside their general area, ensuring that they grew to have a sound knowledge of their area and its population. One advantage fully exploited by Koevoet was that the Fighting Groups were not bound by company, battalion or sector boundaries once following up information, and could pursue their quarry wherever it led them.

The key to Koevoet's outstanding success lay in its information—intelligence—action cycle. This was run as low as Fighting Group level and was never allowed to break off. Every group member was an integral part of the intelligence collection and evaluation system. 'Brainstorming' sessions were regular features at all levels. In the field, a patrolling group would continuously gather information, sift and evaluate it, follow it up, develop it into intelligence and then follow it up to a contact, all the while feeding it back to the headquarters. There it was collated with information and intelligence from other Police and Army sources, and the result was fed back out to the field.

A second key element in Koevoet's success was the fact that all contacts—except against one or two terrorists—were fought mounted. That gave the Fighting Group the advantages of mounted action—shock, mobility, armour protection, firepower—and the better visibility from a high vehicle than down in the bush. The vehicles also enabled Koevoet to track terrorists over vast distances too quickly for them to effectively apply counter-tracking techniques, and so quickly that they could often run them down. Koevoet took the basic concepts of detective work—walking the beat and driving patrol—and combined them with basic mechanised infantry tactics, and a simple, tough and highly mobile vehicle ideally suited to the bush. The result was a doctrine and a force that the terrorists could not match. Once 101 Bn. had adopted similar



This Casspir mounts a captured 14.5mm HMG; other 'fits' included the 20mm cannon from a Vampire jet fighter, and Yugoslav 20mm cannon stripped from captured M-55 triple mounts. This photo was taken at a 'Koevoet' base; note the neat camouflage uniforms complete with rank chevrons, Police cap badges, and caps with fold-up neck flaps.

tactics, SWAPO operations in Owambo became virtually suicidal. By 1987 terrorists had about 36 hours before Koevoet or tot were in pursuit.

SWA Police Protection Unit

This grew out of a home guard started by the SA Police and taken over by the Army for a time. Its main task was to protect politicians and traditional leaders targeted by SWAPO for assassination; it also protected key government buildings and installations. These protection detachments varied in strength from one or two men to a reinforced platoon, depending on the level of the threat and the nature of the target. Similarly, the precautions taken at the various protected kraals and installations varied from a simple fence to an earth wall with proper bunkers and emplaced machine guns. Equipment consisted essentially of light infantry weapons up to the light machine gun and 60mm mortar. Some mine-protected vehicles were also issued as needed.

The Special Constables of the Protection Force were recruited in the northern regions of South-West Africa, and employed in

their home areas. Basic training lasted eight weeks, including basic weapons instruction and rural COIN operations, with the emphasis on protection tasks. They were eligible for promotion up to Special Warrant Officer, with promotion purely on merit. They could transfer to the SWA Police proper, but first had to undergo the basic training at the Police College. Despite their relatively short training, the special constables generally acquitted themselves well in action, and no detachment was ever overrun.

ANGOLAN FORCES

UNITA

By the late 1970s the growing effectiveness of UNITA's war against FAPLA had drawn renewed interest from the South Africans. They first allowed logistic access through SWA, then assisted with training, and then passed on some weapons and equipment captured from SWAPO. By the mid-1980s UNITA had begun building a semi-conventional force capable of attacking isolated Angolan units and defending UNITA territory.

UNITA's forces—still operating successfully at the time of writing—are formed into Dispersed, Compact, Semi-Regular, Regular and Special elements. The guerilla force comprises Dispersed and Compact elements and operates throughout much of Angola. They are controlled through an organisation of Fronts, Military Regions, Sectors and Zones, commanded by brigadiers/colonels, colonels/lieutenant-colonels, majors and captains. A typi-



Three pre-production 155mm G-6 SP guns were deployed for a month during the 1987-88 fighting,

and were instrumental in keeping the air base at Cuito Cuanavale closed down.

The Wolf Turbo was developed in South-West Africa to replace the Casspir; it never did, but was taken into service alongside the earlier design by 'Koevoet'. This early example has a .50 cal./7.62mm mount above the cab, a 7.62mm 'bow gun, and provision for up to five FN-MAG 58 LMGs firing to each side, with provision for MG-4s on each rear corner. Later Wolfs dispensed with the side-firing MGs and had only rifle ports.



cal Zone has 50 guerrillas; Sectors have 300 men, and regional staffs of around 150 officers and men to control, co-ordinate and support the Sectors. The Dispersed Forces have limited training and equipment, and are used mainly for intelligence, transport and food-production. The Compact Forces are better trained and equipped, and conduct guerrilla operations in assigned areas.

The Semi-Regular Battalions can operate as self-contained units, with integral artillery and logistic elements. They are used to intensify guerrilla activity in selected areas and in support of the Regular Battalions. During the 1987/8 campaign in south-east Angola several Semi-Regular Battalions operated in a screening role for the South Africans. The Regular Battalions are light infantry units with the best-trained troops and with a fairly comprehensive scale of support weapons, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, multiple rocket launchers, heavy mortars and some guns. A small number of captured armoured vehicles is in service. UNITA's Special Forces have the normal roles: deep reconnaissance, sabotage, ambushes in the enemy rear, *et al.*

In a Third World context UNITA's forces are notably well-disciplined and effective. Their equipment is a mix of Warsaw Pact, Chinese and South African items, with most of the light weapons being of Soviet manufacture. Heavy weapons include Soviet 120mm mortars and the Chinese Type-63 107mm multiple rocket launcher. ZU-23-2 23mm cannon and 14.5mm ZPU-1 HMGs, SA-7s and Stingers are used in the anti-aircraft role, the latter with particular success. Logistic vehicles are a mix of Soviet types captured from FAPLA and South African trucks.

Angolan armed forces

The security forces clashed with FAPLA during some of the external operations and while deployed in support of UNITA. The Angolan forces involved were the conventional forces, organised in

'brigades'. The Angolan brigade is similar to a Soviet motorised rifle regiment in organisation but not as well equipped. It has three motorised infantry battalions; a tank company of ten T-54/T-55s; and a mixed artillery battalion. Supporting elements include a reconnaissance company with PT-76s and BRDM-2s, and an engineer company or platoon. The standard establishment is 1,900, but actual strength varies widely, casualties and desertion at times outstripping recruiting. One result has been a steady decline in the length and quality of training. The Angolan army also uses 'tactical groups': essentially battalion groups formed around an infantry battalion with various supporting elements.

Each motorised infantry battalion has three companies of three platoons, using BTR-60s, older BTR-152s or trucks; BMP-1 and -2 ICVs are used by some brigades. The companies have the usual light machine guns, RPG-7s, and 60mm mortars. The battalion



The Ratel-ZT3 saw its first action on 10 September 1987, when a pre-production vehicle

knocked out several T-55s of FAPLA's 21 Bde. as the brigade attempted to cross the Lomba River.

has four support elements: a mortar platoon with six 82mm tubes, and anti-tank platoon with either six Sagger ATGWs or six B-10 recoilless guns; a grenade-launcher platoon with six AGS-17s; and an air defence platoon with three SA-7 and four 14.5mm ZPU-1 heavy machine guns. The artillery battalion usually has six batteries: two each with six 122mm D-30s, two each with four ZIS-3 76mm guns, one with eight 122mm BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, and one with six 120mm mortars. Additional tanks, air defence elements and artillery are attached as needed. 130mm M-46 guns are used in support of the brigades in major actions, and some T-62s are also available.

The Angolan air force has MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters and a small number of Su-22 and Su-25 ground-attack aircraft. MiG-21s fly in the ground-attack role, the MiG-23s in both ground-attack and air-superiority roles. Mi-24, -25 and -35 Hinds are used in the normal gunship roles, as are some armed Mi-18s and -13s. An-26 transports are often used in the reconnaissance role. The Cubans flew mainly MiG-23s, some of which were also flown by Soviets. The air force is notably unaggressive over UNITA territory.

SWAPO

SWAPO President Nujoma was Commander in Chief of PLAN, working through a Secretary for Defence and an Armed Forces Commander, who had a staff comprising the Chief Political Commissar and the Chiefs of the Intelligence, Logistics, Communications, Medical, Personnel, and Operations Treasury departments. The National Headquarters was in Luanda and the Defence Headquarters at Lubango in south-west Angola. Operations were controlled by the Command Post, deployed first in the area of Bambi Chetquera, then west of Mupa after having been located by the South Africans, and finally moving to near Peu Peu in 1989, covered by Cuban troops. It moved around frequently within a general area as a security measure. Operations were originally run by SWAPO headquarters in Lusaka, but after that was attacked by

Rhodesian special forces in 1979 during a raid on ZIPRA most functions and staff were moved to Luanda. Lusaka was thereafter only responsible for terrorists based in Zambia.

The National Headquarters was responsible for mobilising support internationally, and for determining the priority and intensity of the armed struggle. The Defence Headquarters was responsible for PLAN development and operations, liaison with the Angolans and Cubans, logistic planning and support, training camps, and personnel administration. The training camps included the Tobias Hanyeko Training Centre, Ongulumbashe, Jumbo, and specialised training camps. Operations orders went from Defence Headquarters to the Command Post for detailed planning and execution.

The Command Post exercised command and control through the Front headquarters, co-ordinated the activities of the Fronts, and was responsible for logistic planning and supply. It also exercised command over PLAN units involved in joint operations with FAPLA against UNITA. The actual conduct of operations fell to the Front Headquarters: North-Western, Northern and North-Eastern. Each fielded a mobile headquarters responsible for operations and the security of its base areas, generally in co-operation with the Angolans, and an administrative wing. There was also a Front Headquarters at Senaga in Zambia, to control the terrorists there, and a central Front deployed north of the others as a holding formation.

A multi-purpose 'Specialist Unit' handled transit and logistic matters, 'education' and propaganda, and provided early warning for the Front Headquarters. It had 260 men in a 100-man HQ with a 40-man reserve platoon, and four 30-man platoons. It had SA-7s, 60mm and 82mm mortars and RPG-7s. There were also conventional units, organised similarly to the FAPLA brigades. They were mainly employed against UNITA although they had been intended as a protection force against security force raids.

The North-Western Front operated in Kaokoland and west Owambo. It had four detachments and supporting reconnaissance, engineer, artillery and air-defence elements. One detachment, 'Special Forces', concentrated on sabotage, mine-laying and abductions. The others had special names—'Naval Forces', 'Air



South African infantry clearing up Chitido during Operation 'Klipkop' in 1980. They wear nutria fatigues, and modified '67 pattern webbing with pouches for the longer R-4 magazines. The trooper on the right also wears home-made chest webbing, and has an entrenching tool thrust into his belt and shoulder brace at the left hip; the man on the left has a commercial rucksack.



1: Ptn. Ldr., 102 Bn. SWATF, 1981
 1a: 102 Bn. SWATF
 2: Sec. Ldr., 1 Bn. SA Cape Corps, 1987
 3: Rifleman, 911 Bn. SWATF, 1980
 3a: 911 Bn. SWATF
 4: Rifleman, 61 Mech. Bn. group SADF



- 1: Captain, 32 Bn. SADF, 1981
2: Rifleman, 32 Bn.; JMC, 1984
3: Cpl., 32 Bn.; barracks dress
4: Sgt., 201 Bn. SWATF



SWAPOL-COIN ('Koevoet'):

- 1: Group Leader, early 1980s
- 2: Special WO, 'Zulu Alpha', late 1980s
- 3: Special WO, late 1980s

- 1: Major, SAP Security Branch
- 2: Special Sgt., SWAPOL Protection Force
- 3: Special Constable, SAP Security Branch



- 1: Major, SA Armd. Corps
- 2: Staff Sgt., SA Armd. Corps
- 3: Captain, SAAF





- 1: 'Mountie', SWA Spec. Unit, 1980
- 2: Motorcyclist, SWA Spec. Unit
- 3: Dog handler, SWA Spec. Unit



- 1: Captain, Mirage pilot, SAAF
- 1a: Pilot's wings
- 2: Helicopter flight engineer, SAAF
- 2a: Flight engineer's wing
- 3: Ops. Medic

- 1: UNITA Captain, 1988
- 2: SWAPO 'Detachment', 1980
- 3: FAPLA Colonel, JMMC, 1989



Forces', and 'Ground Forces'—but only for propaganda purposes. Detachments normally had 150 men, organised into a headquarters and four or five platoons of three 10-man sections. Each platoon had a commissar, reconnaissance and intelligence sections, and some engineers. The detachments operated from temporary bases in southern Angola. Supporting elements were assigned as needed.

The Northern Front operated in central Owambo. It had five detachments of 150 men in three or four platoons of 36 men, and a reconnaissance group of 30 men in eight sections. Artillery, air defence, engineer and medical elements were assigned as needed. Six of the reconnaissance sections routinely accompanied platoons entering Owambo. Its headquarters included a 'Special Force' with several groups of 28 men in four sections of seven. Their functions included mine-laying, pipeline, telephone line and government building sabotage. Sabotage teams were attached to platoons, but broke away to do their work.

The North-Eastern Front operated in east Owambo and Kavango. It had five detachments that were often reinforced, sometimes up to 500 men. Its Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Communications sections deployed away from the operational and administrative wings of the headquarters most of the time. The Intelligence Section had ten intelligence specialists and an infantry platoon of 30/40 men. Each detachment platoon also had an intelligence/reconnaissance section.

SWAPO equipment was the usual mix of Eastern block arms. The average group carried an RPG-7 with several reloads, a light machine gun and AK-47 rifles. By the mid-1980s the RPG-7 was being replaced or complemented with the handier RPG-75. The SKS carbine was also used, mainly to fire rifle grenades. Both 60mm and 82mm mortars were used, as were light recoilless rifles and single-tube 122mm rocket launchers. From the mid-1980s some groups carried SA-7s. Another development was the appearance of Dragunov sniping rifles with some groups. Radios were available, but not very often carried by the smaller groups.

EXTERNAL OPERATIONS

SWAPO insurgency in South-West Africa was largely ineffective until the Portuguese collapse in Angola. The new Moscow-orientated regime in Luanda allowed SWAPO to operate from camps in southern Angola, giving them direct access to South-West Africa's largest single population group, across a border that was no more than a very dilapidated fence in perfectly flat terrain. The result was rapid intensification of terrorism in Owambo. By 1978 the situation had deteriorated to a point where drastic choices had to be taken.

The wide-open border, flat terrain, and thick bush greatly facilitated terrorist movement into and out of Owambo—on foot, by bicycle and by vehicle. Many of their attacks could be carried out in the course of a night, with the attackers safe in Angola well before first light. With almost 500 kilometres of border between Owambo and Angola, these attacks were impossible to counter effectively. Worse, the bulk of the Owambo population lived close to the border, making it exceptionally vulnerable. The options open to the security forces were thus very limited—essentially to a choice between concentrating the population in defensible localities, or



Alongside more formidable weapons, the 14.5mm ZPU-1 was widely used by SWAPO in both the anti-aircraft and ground roles:

one succeeded in knocking out a Ratel-20 during Operation 'Sceptic', during which this example was captured.

striking the terrorists in their Angolan camps before they could do any harm. Demographic and economic realities made effective population protection impracticable.

Operation Reindeer

The first cross-border operation was *Operation Reindeer* on 4 May 1978. It was aimed at the main SWAPO training and support camp at Cassinga—known as 'Moscow'—and at several forward transit camps in the immediate border area, including a camp complex known as 'Vietnam' near Chetequera 28km north of the border. Cassinga, some 250km inside Angola, was struck by a composite parachute battalion drawn from units of 44 Brigade. The drop did not go perfectly; but once they had sorted themselves out, the paras dealt with those terrorists who had survived the opening air strike and cleared the base, seizing documents and destroying equipment. Pumas and Frelons were then called in from a Helicopter Administrative Area established nearby to extract them. The relieving Angolan force was held off in some brief clashes and by air strikes, although the first tank reached the LZ as the last helicopter lifted off. The SWAPO camps near the border were dealt with by a mechanised force, Combat Group Juliet, which made the first operational use of the new Ratel-20 ICV. *Reindeer* cost SWAPO some 800 killed and around 200 captured, for the loss of six paratroopers killed. It took years for SWAPO to recover from this loss, and the seized documents proved to be an intelligence bonanza.

Operation Safraan

The second major external operation was launched in late 1979 to disrupt a major SWAPO build-up in south-west Zambia aimed at re-activating East Caprivi. SWAPO decided not to contest the issue, and withdrew from its Zambian camps before they could be attacked. While that limited their casualties, the Zambian government took note and restricted SWAPO's presence and operations from that country severely, effectively ending the terrorist threat to Caprivi.



Operation Rekstok

This took the form of air strikes and raids by heliborne troops on SWAPO camps in southern Angola between 6 March and 15 March 1979. Targets around Cahama were also attacked by the SAAF. The heliborne force consisted of two infantry combat teams, each of six platoons, and a small Special Forces element. Like *Safraan*, however, *Rekstok* found mostly abandoned camps.

Operation Sceptic

Angola had meanwhile allowed SWAPO to expand its presence in the south opposite Owambo. *Operation Sceptic* in June 1980 began as a short operation aimed at a major camp complex nicknamed 'Smokeshell'. As the operation proceeded, however, intelligence revealed other camps in the area, and *Sceptic* was extended. *Sceptic*

brought the first clash with SWAPO mechanised elements, and also saw the Angolans become involved when a small mechanised force engaged the withdrawing security forces unsuccessfully. SWAPO lost its forward staging camps and lost some 380 killed, as well as several hundred tons of equipment and stores, and many vehicles. 17 members of the security forces died.



► *Casevac during Op. 'Sceptic'; the Puma has landed right beside the APCs. The absence of visible weapons suggests that this area had been confirmed as secured.*



▼ *T-34/85 captured in its hide outside Xangongo during Op. 'Protea', 1981. Several T-34s were knocked out by Ratel-90s during this operation.*



Operation Protea

The next major external operation followed a year later, when intelligence indicated a larger than usual SWAPO build-up in southern Angola, and also that the Angolans had deployed elements to protect SWAPO base areas. This intelligence had come to hand in part as a result of foot-mobile operations *Operation Carnation*—conducted against the SWAPO infrastructure to the east of Ongiva. In another development, the Angolan air defence radar system had also begun to warn SWAPO of SAAF aircraft movements. *Protea* was therefore planned taking the Angolan

forces into account, providing for possible semi-conventional clashes.

It opened on 24 August 1981 with air strikes on the key elements of the Angolan air defence system. A mechanised force then attacked Xangongo, the site of SWAPO's 'North-Western Front' headquarters, while other elements dealt with camps to the south and south-east of the town. Xangongo was isolated against interference by Angolan forces from Humbe and Peu Peu to the north-west and north-east respectively, and its mixed SWAPO/Angolan defenders were evicted after a brisk fight against dug-in tanks and infantry in and around the town.

With Xangongo cleared the main body moved east and south, brushing aside an Angolan force at Mongua, and taking Ongiva on the 28th after some resistance by mixed SWAPO/Angolan forces. Several Soviet officers were killed, and a warrant officer was captured; SWAPO facilities were destroyed, and the operation was wound down, ending on 1 September 1981. The security forces lost 10 men killed; SWAPO and FAPLA suffered some 1,000 killed, and lost 4,000 tons of equipment and more than 200 vehicles including some tanks.

Operation Daisy

Intelligence gained during *Protea* led to *Operation Daisy*, launched on 1 November 1981. *Daisy* saw the deepest penetration into Angola since the deployment in support of the FNL and UNITA during the Angolan civil war, one combat group penetrating to the SWAPO headquarters at Bambi and the camp at Cheraquera, almost 300km inside Angola. Several SWAPO forward transit camps near the border were also attacked. The Angolan forces generally stayed clear, but MiG-21s did enter the area until one was shot down in a clash with SAAF Mirages. *Operation Daisy* ended on 20 November.

Operation Mebos

Mounted during July and August 1982, this was a series of air-mobile raids on SWAPO's command and control structure. SWAPO suffered 345 killed, and its Eastern Front headquarters



South African infantry during Op. 'Protea'; all wear '67 pattern webbing and carry R-4s, except for the LMG No.1 with his FN-MAG 58. Note hats tied to epaulettes with lanyards – the only way to hang on to them in thick bush.

was overrun near Mupa, important files being seized. The security forces lost 29 killed—15 of them in one incident when a Puma was shot down.

Operation Askari

SWAPO took some time to recover from *Protea*, *Daisy* and *Mebus*. Terrorism remained at a low level for more than a year, well within the capability of internal security force operations. The latter part of 1983, however, brought intelligence that SWAPO was preparing again to intensify its operations against both Owambo and the farming districts to the south. It was decided to pre-empt SWAPO again by striking their concentrations in southern Angola. As during 1981, the Angolans had deployed elements to protect the SWAPO build-up. The intervening period had also been used to up-grade Angolan air defence capability. Intelligence reports to this effect were confirmed when an Impala returned from a reconnaissance sortie with the seeker and warhead of an SA-9 imbedded in its tail. The new SA-8 system was also deployed.

Operation Askari opened with air defence suppression strikes, the ground forces crossing their start lines on 6 December 1983. Four mechanised groups of some 500 men each moved to attack specific targets, while smaller infantry forces carried out area operations in the border region. The emphasis was on disrupting SWAPO logistics, primarily south and south-east of Kuvango. The SWAPO headquarters at Lubango was also attacked by aircraft. While the raiding force tried to avoid contact with Angolan units, there were several clashes. The most serious was on 3 January when the Angolan 11th Brigade and two Cuban battalions came to the support of SWAPO defending their base some 5km from Cuvclai. This force was beaten off with 324 casualties, but the fighting cost the raiding forces most of the 21 casualties suffered during the entire operation, many of them in one Ratel-90 that

became entangled in a minefield and was then shot out by a tank. *Operation Askari* was wound up on 13 January 1984, the withdrawal being delayed by heavy rains.

The most important outcome of *Askari* was that it brought Angola into talks in Lusaka leading to a disengagement in southern Angola. This was overseen by a Joint Monitoring Commission of SADF and FAPLA officers and, although beset by delays, did bring a measure of peace to a part of the region for a time, until SWAPO were again allowed to establish themselves in the area north of Owambo.


Smaller Operations

Apart from the seven major incursions, the security forces also carried out many smaller operations. Some, such as *Operation Super* in March 1982, were aimed at disrupting particular SWAPO concentrations before the terrorists could cross into SWA; or at disrupting SWAPO's forward build-up generally, such as *Operations Boswilger* and *Egret* in 1985. Others, such as *Operation Klipkop* in July 1980 and *Operation Firewood* in October 1987,



Just some of the 'soft skins' captured tanks can be made out at top left. *Protea*, 1981; a few of the

Operation 'Moduler':
Major Andre Retief briefs
his E Squadron, SA School
of Armour. He wears the
standard fire-resistant
overalls, as do most of his
men; note rear flap
covering the 'rescue strap'
behind the shoulders. See
Plate E.



were aimed at disrupting SWAPO's forward logistics or its command and control system. *Firewood* saw infantry raid the forward headquarters of SWAPO's Central Front, some 35 kilometres north of Cassinga; more than 150 SWAPO died in seven hours of intense fighting in heavily wooded terrain. Several hundred were dispersed, some of them wounded. The attacking force lost 12 killed, five of them in an APC that was hit by anti-tank fire. 'Hot pursuit' operations also continued, sometimes contested by SWAPO and FAPLA. Some of the resultant clashes were quite intense: in July 1987, 190 SWAPO and Angolan troops died near Dova, 85km north of the border, when they ambushed a pursuing force; the security forces suffered one man wounded.

* * *

The purpose of external operations was to hamper SWAPO terrorism in northern SWA by disrupting its command and control, pushing its logistic support and transit camps deeper into Angola, inflicting heavy casualties, and pre-empting annual infiltrations and some specific 'offensives'. The evidence indicates that this strategy worked. Terrorism in northern SWA was steadily reduced to manageable levels. The forces involved in internal counter-insurgency operations were able to gain the initiative and increasingly win the co-operation of local civilians, further restricting SWAPO's operations and greatly hampering its 'armed propaganda' efforts in the northern part of the country.

SUPPORT FOR UNITA

1975/76: Operation Savannah

On 25 April 1974 a coup d'état toppled the Portuguese government and led to Portugal's withdrawal from Africa.¹ Angola approached independence in confusion, with three 'liberation movements' soon in open conflict: the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA. In August 1975 the MPLA asked Moscow for troops, and was referred to Castro, who was assured that Moscow would pay the bills. Cuban troops began to arrive in larger numbers, building up to 15,000 men by early 1976. The prospect of the Moscow-orientated MPLA ruling Angola was not welcomed in South Africa. Other African states were also unhappy, and approached South Africa to 'shoulder her responsibilities as an African power' and intervene. UNITA and the FNLA had begun asking for support as early as March 1975.

South Africa deployed a small force in August 1975 to protect the Calucque hydro-electric plant, and some infantry weapons

⁽¹⁾ See MAA 202, *Modern African Wars* (2)

were supplied to the FNLA. The South Africans then agreed to provide advisors and instructors to run training camps at Calombo (UNITA) and Mapupa (FNLA), to train 6,000 men in six weeks, to enable UNITA and the FNLA to prevent an MPLA take-over before independence on 11 November. By mid-September, however, MPLA forces controlled almost every town between Luanda and the border and were holding their own in the north. The South Africans became more actively involved; they took over planning and support weapons, and then assumed partial command. The deployment now received a name, *Operation Savannah*. The first combat came on 5 October when a UNITA company with 14 South African advisors was ambushed near Norton de Matos; the UNITA troops fled, leaving the advisors to destroy two T-34s and drive the ambushers out of their positions. This clash brought the MPLA advance to a halt.

The second phase of *Operation Savannah* was to reverse the tide and gain as much ground as possible before 11 November. A minimum South African combat force was authorised, which never passed 2,000 men organised into four combat groups; these were soon rapidly pushing the MPLA back.

The first, **Task Force Zulu**, was assembled at Cuangar, and was able to move out on 14 October; it comprised one battalion of mostly Caprivian Bushmen and one of 1,000 hastily trained FNLA troops. Heavy weapons were limited to some 81mm mortars and Vickers MMGs; transport consisted mostly of vegetable and furniture trucks purchased from refugees. Despite its rather shaky start, Zulu went on to set a new record for rapid movement in the face of opposition:

19 October: Takes Ferreira d'Eca. 20 October: Takes Rocadas, in co-operation with armoured cars and a mortar group. 22 October: Takes Joao de Almeida. 24 October: Takes Sa de Bandeira; more

armoured cars and mortars are attached. 28 October: Takes Mocamedes. 31 October: Stops at Catengue to clear eastwards to prevent a renewed MPLA move on Nova Lisboa; co-operates with Task Force Foxbat to destroy an enemy force at Cubal. 4 November: Takes Benguela airport and the MPLA and Cuban training camps and barracks. 5 November: Takes Benguela. 7 November: Takes Lobito; briefly joined by Foxbat. Held up pending a decision whether to withdraw prior to the 11th as intended. 13 November: Takes Novo Redondo. The first South African killed. Part of the force detached to assist Foxbat in the Santa Comba area. After a pause for political assessment of the situation the force was ordered back to Novo Redondo, and later to Cela, and disbanded. During its 33-day advance Zulu covered 3,159km, carried out 14 deliberate attacks, 16 quick attacks and fought 21 skirmishes; 210 enemy troops were killed, 96 wounded and 56 captured for the loss of 5 (1 SA) killed and 41 (20 SA) wounded.

Combat Group Foxbat was formed in mid-October 1975 with a UNITA battalion and a squadron of SA armoured cars, moving out on 25 October to block a Cuban/MPLA advance on Silva Porto. Foxbat then moved west, and detached elements to Santa Comba and Cela. Foxbat took Quibala on the 27th, co-operated with Zulu at Cubal on 1 November, took Norton de Matos on the 3rd, deployed east of Lobito on the 6th to block the enemy's escape from Zulu, moved to Cela on the 9th, and on to Santa Comba on the 11th. Limited action followed in the general Santa Comba-Quibala area over the next three weeks. North of Santa Comba Foxbat fought one of the hardest actions of the campaign around 'Bridge 14'. It now also had a South African infantry company, a mortar platoon, some engineers and a mixed battery of eight 5.5in. and 25pdr. guns. At Bridge 14 Foxbat faced a force including a Cuban infantry battalion supported by Cuban-manned guns and 122mm BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. Fighting around the bridge lasted from 9 to 12 December before the Cuban/MPLA force pulled back. Among the equipment captured were ten 76.2mm field guns, 22 120mm mortars and five BM-21s. (One of the latter was brought back to South Africa, where it became the pattern from which the South African Valkiri MRL was developed.)

Olifant Mk. 1a of the School of Armour, passing a 130mm M-46 gun captured from FAPLA's 21 Bde. on 14 January 1988. The Olifant, a modernised

Centurion, needed all its stamina to operate in the thick bush of south-east Angola; the opposing T-55s proved less of a problem.



This T-54 of FAPLA's 16 Bde. was one of seven T-54/T-55s knocked out, and three captured intact, by the Olifants of E Sqn. School of Armour on 9 November 1987 while working with 4 SAI battalion group.



Task Force Orange was formed on 12 December with a UNITA battalion, an SA armoured car squadron and infantry company, and some artillery. It seized Salazar Bridge over the Cuanzo River north of Massende, and attacked towards Quibala on 15 December to spoil a Cuban attack on Cariango.

Task Force X-Ray was formed to protect the Benguela railway. It took Luso on 11 December after a three-day fight, then split into three combat teams that conducted clearing operations east of Bucaco—taking the Luchia River bridge on 14 December—east of Lumege and south of Luso.

In the north a small South African team joined the FNLA on 6 November. Their advice, supported by the few Americans present, was to concentrate on consolidation and defence. Instead, the FNLA launched an ill-planned and poorly co-ordinated attack on MPLA forces north of Luanda, persisting until all the FNLA gains had been squandered and the bulk of its forces had been used up. Although within 30km of Luanda on independence day, the FNLA was quickly routed and pushed back to the Zaire border. The South African advisors, and some artillery who had been flown in, were evacuated by a SA Navy frigate, their guns being taken out by Zairean troops.

South Africa now faced another major decision. With the northern front stabilised, and the flow of Cuban troops and Soviet weaponry into Angola continuing unabated, the forces deployed in Angola would have to be reinforced or withdrawn. The Western nations had given up the cause as lost, and the limited consensus that had existed among the African states had begun to break up. Several South Africans had also been captured. What had been a comfortably secret operation had now become a very uncomfortably public one with unhappy implications. The OAU split on whether or not to recognise the MPLA government; and South Africa decided that they would not carry the burden of Angola alone. The withdrawal began on 22 January 1976, a line just north of the Angola-SWA border being held until the end of March; Cuban/MPLA forces arrived at the border on 1 April.

Interim Support

After the unhappy experience of 1975/76 the South Africans were not keen to hear about UNITA's problems; but as UNITA effectiveness increased they reviewed the matter. Were UNITA to control south-eastern Angola, SWAPO would not be able to operate from there into Kavango. Limited logistic and training support was provided to UNITA. In time there were other advantages: Angolan forces that might have helped SWAPO in southern Angola were tied down fighting UNITA. FAPLA even had to draw on SWAPO for men to fight UNITA. Luanda reacted to UNITA's growing strength in the south-east with a series of unsuccessful offensives from 1981 to 1984.

The 1985 offensive was more dangerous. FAPLA concentrated 20 brigades between June and August, with new MiG-23s, Mi-24s and Mi-17s in support. Soviet officers handled operational/logistic planning. The offensive had one arm aimed at the Cazombo salient and another at Mavinga; the northern arm had nine brigades and a tank battalion, the southern 11 brigades and a tank battalion. Both reached their first objectives by 7 September. UNITA could not resist on both fronts, and chose to defend Mavinga. FAPLA was finally stopped in early October, only 28km from Mavinga. This fighting saw the first South African combat involvement since 1976: artillery strikes and attacks by Impalas were instrumental in stopping FAPLA. FAPLA casualties were around 2,500 killed and wounded, UNITA's around 500 killed and 1,500 wounded. FAPLA equipment losses included 8 MiGs, 6 Mi-24s, some other aircraft, 32 armoured vehicles and 100 trucks.

In 1986 Soviet officers took over co-ordinating all operations against UNITA. The Cubans were reinforced to 45,000 men to free more FAPLA troops for a new offensive. UNITA meanwhile regained control of the Cazombo salient, the SAAF assisting by flying men and supplies from the south. FAPLA was ready to attack in June; 11 brigades pushed south from Luena and Cazombo, eight east from Cuito Cuanavale. On 5 June Namibe



T-55 of 59 Bde. knocked out on 14 February 1988 by an Olifant of F Sqn., School of Armour; the APFSDS projectile penetrated the sand berm in front of the Angolan tank and entered the turret above and right of the gunner's sight.

harbour was attacked; a Cuban cargo ship was sunk, two Soviet cargo ships were damaged, and oil tanks on shore were destroyed and damaged. The attackers were said to have been an SAN strike craft and a special forces team. While FAPLA's northern force reached Cangamba, fuel problems delayed the southern force; UNITA ambushes along the supply road from Menongue worsened the situation. FAPLA expected to be ready again on 15 August. During the night of 9–10 August their airbase at Cuito Cuanavale was attacked by ground forces; fuel, bomb and ammunition dumps were blown up, radars, gun and SAM systems were destroyed, and the bridge over the Cuito was rendered useless to vehicles. The offensive was called off.

The 1987–88 Campaign

During February/March 1987 FAPLA began a renewed build-up in the 3rd and 6th Military Regions; Soviet arms deliveries by air and sea increased dramatically, and four Soviet Il-76s were deployed to move troops, critical equipment and fuel to the forward areas. UNITA responded as before, harassing FAPLA throughout the country and interdicting logistic movements. From July onwards this became their main effort. The FAPLA offensive began in mid-August, again with two prongs: four brigades advanced south from Lucusse, four brigades and two tactical groups west from Cuito Cuanavale. The northern force reached Cassamba and Cangamba despite UNITA harassment, but then settled down there. It finally ran short of supplies—partly due to UNITA operations and partly to inefficiency—and withdrew to Lucusse. The southern force set out on 14 August from the Tumpo area.

The South Africans were concerned that this offensive might succeed, and open 650km of border to SWAPO. They deployed some artillery (127mm MRLs; 120mm mortars) protected by infantry of 32 Bn. to support UNITA—*Operation Modular*. The artillery groups harassed FAPLA to good effect but could not stop the advance. UNITA had not yet fully deployed their forces, and their lightly equipped infantry would in any case find it difficult to stop a strong mechanised force. The South Africans now deployed '61 Mech' and the anti-tank squadron of 32 Battalion.

The latter was the first to clash with FAPLA, stopping 21 Brigade's attempt to cross the Lomba on 9 and 10 September. This fighting saw pre-production ZT3 ATGWs destroy three T-55s. Further clashes occurred between the South Africans and FAPLA's 21 and 47 Bdes., the latter accompanied by a tactical group. In one action the tactical group lost 382 men and six T-55s,

the South Africans eight men, a Ratel-90 and two Casspirs. A battery of 155mm G-5s had meanwhile also deployed, their 40+ km range enabling the South Africans to shell FAPLA in the entire area covered by the fighting. Mirages and Buccaneers flew a series of damaging strikes. On 3 October 61 Mech struck 47 Bde. as it began to cross the Lomba to join 59 on the north bank. The Ratel-90s and -20s, supported by artillery, destroyed 47 Bde. as a fighting force: it lost 250 killed, 18 tanks, 3 ICVs, 16 APCs and 120 trucks; three SA-8 and two SA-9 systems were also captured. The destruction of 47 Bde. marked the end of the offensive, FAPLA withdrawing to the headwaters of the Cuzizi and Cunzumbia.

The South Africans decided to follow up: if they could inflict a decisive defeat on FAPLA just when Moscow was refurbishing its image and was critically short of cash, it might force a change in the overall situation in south-western Africa. The trick was to escalate just enough to inflict a decisive defeat, without pushing Moscow or Havana into a counter-escalation. One more combat group (4 SAI) was deployed with a tank squadron and additional artillery, including three pre-production G-6 SP 155mm guns. The plan was to tie down FAPLA between the Cuito and Cuzizi rivers, while the main force swung north and west to cut them off from the Chaminga crossing; FAPLA forces east of the Cuito and south of the Chaminga would then be destroyed. (The preferred military options—of taking Cuito Cuanavale from the west or putting in a block in the Longa area—were refused: the government did not want South African troops taking and holding Angolan towns, and it did not want to call up any large Citizen Force elements, which this would have demanded.) The artillery would meanwhile harass FAPLA until the new combat group arrived. By mid-October the G-5s had been moved so far forward that they were able to force the closure of the Cuito Cuanavale airbase.

The first attack struck FAPLA's 16 Bde. at the Chaminga source on 9 November, driving it out of its positions; the South Africans then engaged the other forces south of the Chaminga. This fighting cost FAPLA 525 killed, 33 tanks, 3 SA-13 systems, 15 APCs and 111 trucks; South African losses were 17 killed, three Ratels and some support vehicles destroyed. *Operation Modular* was wound up in mid-December.

FAPLA had, however, moved up additional forces, enabling them to resume the offensive once the South Africans had withdrawn: the defeat had not been decisive enough. South Africa decided to extend the campaign to clear all FAPLA forces from east of the Cuito; this became *Operation Hooper*. It was delayed by the need to rotate the troops involved, who had come to the end of their national service, and only began properly in January.

The first action was an attempt on 2 January 1988 to drive 21 Bde. out of its positions next to the Cuatir II River by artillery and direct fire followed by a UNITA attack. This did not work, so 21 Bde. was attacked by a joint SADF/UNITA force on 13 January, being driven out of its positions in two hours of fighting that cost it 250 killed and 12 tanks. 21 Bde. regrouped and was able to retake its positions from UNITA some time later.

On 14 February a joint SADF/UNITA force attacked the 59 Bde. positions south of 21 Brigade. FAPLA broke contact after three-and-a-half hours of fighting, later launching an unsuccessful counter-attack. 59 Bde. withdrew, having lost some 230 men, nine tanks and various other equipment; the SADF lost four men killed. UNITA had simultaneously attacked 21 Bde., forcing it out of its positions yet again for only light losses. FAPLA's 25 Bde., deployed south of 59, now also withdrew.

FAPLA had now been driven off the Chaminga highlands; the South Africans and UNITA now planned to drive them off the east bank of the Cuito altogether. The artillery meanwhile continued with its harassment, including strikes on convoys on the road from Menongue and on Menongue airbase by a small force that moved up west of the Cuito.

On 25 and 29 February combined SADF/UNITA attacks drove FAPLA into a small perimeter around the Cuito Cuanavale bridge. Neither was decisive, however, intense enemy artillery fire preventing proper exploitation. Command at Cuito Cuanavale had been taken over by the Cuban Gen. Cintrás Frias, who had organised his artillery well, with most of the guns and rocket launchers behind the high ground on the west bank out of sight of—and danger from—the South Africans. The SADF/UNITA attacks were forced to move into a funnel of low ground between rivers and in full view of the high ground opposite—one reason why the army had wanted to take the town from the west.

The South Africans now replaced the national service units with elements of the Citizen Force 82 Brigade, the operation becoming *Operation Packer*. This force carried out one more attack on 23 March, to drive FAPLA into the smallest possible perimeter, and then began creating an obstacle and mine belt intended to inhibit any enemy offensive during the next campaigning season. On 30 April 82 Bde. handed over to a single combat group which deployed as a covering force while the barrier belt was completed. Its deployment until 29 August, when all South African forces withdrew, was known as *Operation Displace*.

The South Africans lost 43 killed in this campaign. Equipment losses were two Mirages, one Bosbok, three Olifant Mk Is (Centurion tanks), and four Rarrels, as well as a number of Casspirs. FAPLA losses in fighting involving the South Africans had by 25 February amounted to 4,768 killed; perhaps another 800 died in the later clashes—by then FAPLA were more careful of their communication system and details could not always be obtained. Equipment losses during this fighting included 8 MiG-23s, 4 Mig-21s, 2 Su-22s and 8 helicopters; 94 tanks, 9 BMP-1s, 65 BTR-60s, and 32 BRDM-2s; 4 M-46 130mm guns, 11 D-30 122mm guns, 33 BM-21s, and 3 BM-14s; 7 SA-8 systems, 5 SA-13 systems, 3 SA-9 systems, 33 SA-14 and SA-16 man-portable SAMs, and 377 trucks.

The main effect of the campaign was to convince all parties that the time had come to negotiate their way out of the Angolan mire and leave it to the Angolans. The Soviets and Cubans agreed to a phased withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola and the South Africans, satisfied on that score, agreed to hold UN-supervised elections for a new government in South-West Africa, which would then become independent Namibia. South African support

for UNITA ended at the same time. Much to the surprise of many observers, this did not spell the end for UNITA. Still supported by the US through Zaire, UNITA was able to continue its operations and to defeat the next major FAPLA offensive in 1990. That defeat seems to have convinced Luanda that negotiations might be the answer. Whether these will lead to a settlement remains open.

THE PLATES

A1: Platoon Leader, 102 Battalion SWATF; Kaokoland, 1987

This second-lieutenant is typical of infantry in the field, who soon adapted uniforms and equipment to suit them: shirtsleeves were cut short, bush hats turned into caps, sweatbands made out of towels or issue scarves, etc. 'Nutria'—the term for brown South African field dress—came into use in 1971, consisting of shirt, trousers, bush jacket and hat; a cold weather jacket was added later. He is wearing the '73 pattern' web belt with four 1-litre plastic water bottles in the standard carriers; a metal canteen cup fits under the bottle. He has an experimental load-bearing vest for his ammunition, and a commercial hiking pack and frame. M-79s came into limited use during *Operation Sacamuh* and were often used by platoon and section leaders. A South African 40mm single-round launcher came into use later, followed by a six-round 'revolver' weapon in the section support role. Badges of rank were not usually worn in the bush. In camp he would have worn SWATF 'pips' (see accompanying chart), and the 102 Bn. shoulder flash (inset).

A2: Section Leader, 1st Battalion SA Cape Corps; Ogongo, western Owambo, 1987

The SA Cape Corps recruits two-year volunteers from the Coloured population, mainly in the Cape Province. It has an infantry tradition dating from World War I. This section leader is wearing the standard nutria with SA Army corporal's stripes on a 'slip-over' sleeve on both arms. He is wearing the '82 pattern' webbing and pack, the latter on a black frame with padded shoulder straps and belt. He has a radio with a pole antenna in the right upper outside pocket of the pack, and is wearing a single headphone/microphone headset. This webbing introduced 2-litre square-section plastic water bottles, which he is carrying in the lower outside pockets of the pack. He has an R-4 rifle with 30-round magazine, a smoke grenade in the outside chest webbing pouch, and '1000 foot' flare rockets stuck in pack pockets next to the water bottles and radio.

A3: Rifleman, 911 Battalion SWATF; Nkongo, eastern Owambo, 1980

This soldier is wearing the full 73 pattern webbing except for a pack. The sleeping bag in its protective cover is strapped to the yoke above the kidney pouches, the poncho is rolled up in its webbing carrier under the pouches. He is carrying the G-3, the standard rifle of the SWATF at the time. His company was serving with 54 Bn. in eastern Owambo. Inset is the unit badge in its metal shield form, as worn on the right chest in barrack dress.

A4: Riflemen, 61 Mechanised Battalion Group

Infantryman of '61 Mech' wearing the new 'plastic' helmet with a cloth cover with a cap peak, and the '82 pattern' webbing load-bearing vest. This has R-4 magazine pockets on the front, 2-litre water bottles on the sides, and a built-in small pack on the back



Rear of '73 pattern webbing, with pack, blanket, sleeping bag, and poncho roll – see Plates A1, A3.

which is used for another water bottle, a ration pack or a radio. The small pockets on the yoke hold flares and compass, and there is an internal map pocket. The vest was much used by troops working with vehicles, who did not need to carry a full pack; its basic structure is a mesh, so it is reasonably cool. Helmets were rarely worn during the conflict, except during some of the 'externals'. Broad leather, canvas or nylon watch straps with covers for the crystal were common in the operational area, more to protect the watch than to hide any reflection.

B1: Company Commander, 32 Battalion; Operation Super, 1981

32 Battalion was the only SA Army unit to wear camouflage field dress. This was partly because small patrols spent much time in southern Angola: wearing a uniform of similar appearance to that of FAPLA, carrying AK-47s, and with the white troops liberally covered in 'black is beautiful' camouflage cream, a 32 Bn. patrol was not easily identified. This captain is wearing the summer pattern camouflage. It was worn with a broad-brimmed bush hat or a

Portuguese-style 'deer-stalker' hat, both with an orange insert in the crown for identification from above when working with gunships. A jacket was provided for cold weather. Internally, 32 Bn. generally wore nutria. Personal equipment was standard, although the bush-wise men of 32 modified their webbing widely, also using commercial and foreign items; the chest webbing worn by this captain is a typical non-standard item popular with 32 Bn. and some other elements. He is wearing an experimental boot with canvas side inserts; they did not prove very durable and were not accepted into general use.

B2: Rifleman, 32 Battalion; Joint Monitoring Commission, southern Angola, 1984

This rifleman wears the winter-pattern camouflage uniform with a 'deer-stalker' cap, which was often worn with the back flap tucked in or cut off. He is wearing an 82 pattern load-bearing vest and the pack and frame. He has the inner portion of the 82 pattern sleeping bag rolled on top of his pack, 2-litre water bottles in its side pockets, and a 60mm mortar bomb strapped to its back. While

working with the JMC, 32 Bn. carried the South African R-4 rifle. When members of the battalion operated as scouts or snipers they also carried camouflage gloves and face veils. Packs were usually very full and heavy, as their patrols stayed out for a long time and were sometimes too close to the enemy to make frequent resupply possible.

B3: Corporal, 32 Battalion, barracks dress

On parade 32 Bn. wore either their camouflage or, more usually, nutria field dress with their unique camouflage beret, a black 2.5in. stable belt with two quarter-inch white stripes, and white anklets. The beret badge was a face-on Cape Buffalo head, surmounting the usual South African 'candy bar' in arm-of-service colours. Note the unit's patch looped to the shoulder strap.

B4: Sergeant, 201 Battalion SWATF; Omega, West Caprivi

The most distinctive feature of 201 Bn. barracks dress was its 'glengarry' with the battalion's crow badge. 201 Bn. was also one of the first units to use chest webbing, and used various experimental webbing vests, partly because its early tracking role, and the small stature of its Bushmen troops, demanded something more comfortable than the 73 pattern skeleton webbing. Unusually in the SWATF, 201 Bn. used the R-1 and later the R-4 rather than the G-3. Rank badges were the normal SWATF sequence, and a metal shield-shaped crow badge was worn on the chest.

C1: Koevoet (SWAPOL-COIN) Group leader, early 1980s

From the early 1980s, when the results gained with minimal resources (and the forceful lobbying of its commander, Col. 'Stark Hans' Dreyer) secured proper funding and vehicles, Koevoet operated in Groups each of about 40 Ovambo special constables and four white police officers, with four Casspir armoured vehicles and a Blesbok supply vehicle; Wolf Turbo armoured vehicles were later added. This experienced Police warrant officer wears the initial uniform of brown, green and sand Police camouflage; matching bush hats and peaked caps with fold-up neck flaps were also issued. Keeping in touch with another Group operating nearby, this officer wears (as normal in the bush) no ranking or other insignia. For work on foot Army issue webbing was acquired—Koevoet presented a motley appearance, as much early equipment had to be improvised or 'won'. Chest webbing was light and convenient for trackers, and was adopted early, either in olive or black; a standard pattern, also used by 32 Bn., was finally developed. Personal weapons were initially to individual choice; the R-1 rifle was normal at first, but later the folding-stock R-5 in 5.56mm was standardised. Both Uzi and Walther SMGs, M79 and South African grenade-launchers, and a range of pistols were also used; and the Casspirs usually carried a variety of captured Soviet bloc weapons as well. Maximum firepower was the rule.

C2: Special Warrant Officer, Koevoet Group 'Zulu Alpha', late 1980s

In the mid-1980s Police camouflage was abandoned, and Koevoet was ordered into a faded olive drab uniform instead; contrasting with the Army's nutria, this still set the members of this élite unit apart. Camouflage items were unofficially retained for field use, however. In the bush, whites and Ovambos alike tended to go their own way as regards uniform, and shorts and T-shirts were common. Group morale was competitive, and Group T-shirts typically carried this type of privately-acquired logo: a cobra (or

lion, elephant, crocodile, etc.) attacking a SWAPO insurgent armed with an AK. This veteran warrant officer, photographed in 1987, has pockets and shoulder straps from the old camouflage uniform added to 'Zulu Alpha's' T-shirt. The rolled woollen cap comforter was common field headgear; and the footwear are cut-down canvas patrol boots—see C1 for unmodified example. The R-5, with 50-round magazine, was fitted with a broad assault sling. Automatic pistols were very widely carried, for sudden encounters in thick bush.



The '67 pattern webbing harness

C3: Special Warrant Officer. Koevoet, late 1980s

The second issue uniform, in olive drab, included both a bush hat and this cap, worn here with an orange air identification panel on the crown. Rank was seldom worn in the field, but note brassard with SWO symbol on right sleeve—the device was the same as in the SWATF ranking sequence. Foot patrols used Army 73 skeleton webbing with ammo pouches, kidney pouches, carriers for the 1-litre waterbottle, and the patrol bag used as a small pack. Normally, however, the Ovambos moved fast and light, running on the spoor, leaving their kit in the Casspirs apart from a rifle, and perhaps chest webbing and a waterbottle.

(For a full account of Koevoet operations, and further illustrations see *Beneath the Visiting Moon* by Jim Hooper, Lexington Books, ISBN 0-669-24637-9.)

D1: Major, SA Police Security Branch

The SAP camouflage field dress remained unchanged throughout the conflict. It was worn with either a bush hat or the cap as here, both with a woven SAP badge on the front and an orange panel in the crown. It had long trousers and shorts, and a bush jacket for colder weather. The cloth rank badges were similar to those of the Army except that they often had an orange shade for the brass parts of the metal badge. Standard 73 pattern webbing items were used, together with Koevoet-type chest webbing. The Security Branch had investigation teams in the field until the end of the conflict. The standard rifle was the R-1. Pistols were largely a matter of personal choice; standard types were the Walther P-38 and later the Beretta M-92.

D2: Special Sergeant, SWA Police Protection Force

The SWA Police Protection Force and the earlier Home Guard

began their existence wearing items of uniform no longer in service in the SA Army, before finally adopting the SWA Police camouflage. This special sergeant is wearing sand 'DV-long' trousers with a light olive shirt, a sand bush hat, brown army boots and a 73 pattern web belt. He has sewn SA Army sergeant's stripes on the right sleeve only. He is carrying an FN MAG-58, the standard LMG of the Army and the Police COIN Units throughout the conflict. The 'specials' of the Protection Force were often very casual in their dress, frequently mixing uniform items with civilian clothing. Their standard rifle was the G-3.

D3: Special Constable, SA Police Security Branch


Like Koevoet, the Security Branch investigation teams used many locally recruited special constables as trackers, interpreters, and as a protection element. They wore SAP camouflage but usually with Koevoet-style canvas boots in green or sand. This man is wearing a green T-shirt with 'VP' (*Veiligheidspolisie*) on the sleeve and a unit badge on the chest. He is also wearing the plastic liner from the Army steel helmet, uncomfortably hot though it must have been. He has the standard SWA Police chest webbing and a G-3 rifle.

E1: Major, SA Armoured Corps

Armoured vehicle crews wore green fire-resistant overalls, and a jacket of the same cloth in cold weather; boots and personal equipment were standard items. The overalls and jacket have a webbing sling under a flap at the back to allow an injured man to be pulled out quickly. Normal slip-over rank badges were worn, but small velcro-backed badges were also worn on the left chest. The overalls were often very faded, having seen a lot of wear. Pistols were generally carried in standard Army web holsters.



Rear of the '82 pattern load-carrying equipment – see Plate A4. Note the integral rear small pack, side pockets for 2-litre canteens, NCO chevrons on brassards worn on both arms, and slung R-5. The helmet cover has a painted white triangle for quick sub-unit recognition.



The battalion shoulder patch is looped to the base of the shoulder strap; it is rarely seen in the field. These units all saw extensive action in the operational area; the header bars are in white on khaki: (A) 52 Bn. – yellow (left) and red (right), with opposite colour motifs. (B) 53 Bn. – yellow and green border, black centre with

yellow palms and ground. (C) 54 Bn. – yellow and black border, dark green centre with yellow buffalo, black '54' trimmed yellow. (D) 61 Mechanised Bn. – black shield thinly outlined white, white bayonet with red grip detail, yellow lightning bolts thinly outlined white.

wore nutria field dress with an olive crash helmet and chest webbing or a webbing jacker, as in this case. This man is also carrying a privately owned revolver in a leather holster.

F3: Dog handler with pack hound

Dog handlers working with patrol dogs—usually Alsations or Labradors—generally wore full 73 pattern skeleton webbing or later the 82 pattern vest. When working with pack hounds they generally stayed in or near their vehicle, and wore only chest webbing and perhaps a water bottle. The personal weapon was initially an R-1 and from 1980 onwards an R-4, or later an R-5. The pack hounds wore coloured jackets—blue, orange, red, yellow—for visibility from the vehicle or from a helicopter, and were controlled by colour-coded whistles.

G1: Mirage pilot, SAAF

The fighter pilots were, perforce, fairly standard in their flight gear; fire-resistant green flying overalls with a survival/shroud cutting knife on the leg, G-suit, survival vest and 'bone dome', as in this case; later new light-weight green flying boots were introduced. Various survival vests were used over the period, this pilot wearing the latest. Pilots carried various pistols in standard Army holsters or privately bought shoulder holsters. The flying overalls usually bore squadron patches, cloth pilot's wings and rank badges, the latter either on epaulette sleeves or as small velcro-backed patches on the left chest.

G2: Helicopter flight engineer, SAAF

Alouette III gunships provided both close air support and visual reconnaissance during internal and external operations. They flew with a crew of two, pilot and flight engineer/gunner, although sometimes an Army officer would also be aboard to help direct the ground flight. Early in the conflict Alouette and Puma crews sometimes flew in very casual dress—'velskoene', shorts and shirt—but for later conflict they wore the normal flying overalls. Many, however, continued to wear *velskoene*, and many did not always wear their survival vests, particularly during internal operations. Apart from pistols they usually carried R-4s or R-5s for protection on an I/LZ or should they be forced to land.

G3: Operations medic

The Ops Medic—Operational Medical Orderlies—were highly trained orderlies who accompanied most patrols and worked with

E2: Staff-Sergeant, SA Armoured Corps

This staff-sergeant is wearing the standard AFV crew helmet and microphone harness, and faded overalls with chest ranking.

E3: Captain, South African Air Force


SAAF air liaison officers and forward air controllers were an integral element of all but the smallest external operations. In the field with the Army they generally wore the standard nutria field dress, although often with black boots or later with green flight boots. The blue SAAF field jacket with orange liner was often worn in cold weather; this would bear cloth pilot's wings if the officer was a pilot. Senior officers sometimes wore their peaked SAAF cap. Working with the Army, a SAAF officer would normally carry his issue Star 9mm pistol in an Army web holster, and might also carry an R-4 or R-5.

F1: 'Mountie' attached to 53 Battalion; central Owambo 1980


The SWA Specialist Unit used the standard nutria field dress and 73 pattern webbing, but a variety of chest webbing and load-bearing vests were used at different times. This mounted infantryman is wearing the most common of several black nylon vests in use with different pouch configurations, and a 73 pattern web belt with water bottles. The cut-off bush hat was not unusual among troops in the field; another sign of experience was sleeves cut off the nutria shirt. The mounted infantry used the full range of light infantry weapons, this man carrying an R-4.

F2: Motorcyclist


The SWASpes motorcyclists were initially used as a fast-moving reaction force, but later mainly for road and area patrols. They




General




Lieutenant General




Major General




Brigadier



Colonel




Commandant




Major



Captain



Lieutenant



Second Lieutenant



Regimental Sergeant-Major



Warrant Officer Class 1



Warrant Officer Class 2



Staff Sergeant



Sergeant



Corporal



Lance Corporal

South African Defence Force rank insignia. Field rank badges are yellow on nutria brown backing for officers; chevrons are white on brown or drab green.



Major General



Captain



Staff Sergeant



Brigadier



Lieutenant



Sergeant



Colonel



2nd Lieutenant



Corporal



Commandant



Sergeant-Major 1st Class



Lance Corporal



Major



Sergeant-Major 2nd Class



See Plate G3 – SADF corporal's chevrons, and the yellow-on-maroon Operational Medic's chest patch.

the South African combat groups during the fighting in south-east Angola in 1987/88. He is wearing the green uniform (usually worn in the bush with a floppy green peaked field cap and chest webbing) and an SA Army webbing holster, and is carrying a folding-stock AK-47. Rank badges were not worn in the field.

H2: SWAPO 'Detachment' terrorist, 1980

While the small SWAPO 'conventional force' wore uniform, usually standard FAPLA items, terrorists infiltrated into SWA generally worked in civilian clothes—sometimes worn in several layers to allow a quick change on the run. This RPG gunner of a group almost literally run down by an armoured car patrol in mid-1980 was unusual in wearing a sand-coloured uniform with an olive jersey and black army-style boots. He carried an RPG-7 and had several reloads in a simple canvas sling bag. Others of the group all wore civilian clothes and footwear—the days of terrorists wearing issue boots with recognisable sole patterns were almost over by 1980. They carried AK-47s, and one man had an SKS to use with rifle grenades. SWAPO personnel in Angolan camps wore a variety of uniforms including various Warsaw Pact items and others from Kenya.

H3: FAPLA officer; JMMC, 1989

The Angolan Army wore a standard camouflage field dress for most of this period, recalling the Portuguese copies of the 1950s French airborne issue, with either a green beret or a cap. In the field all ranks carried AKs of one or another model, and wore chest webbing. White T-shirts were often worn when not on operations. Map cases and pistol holsters were generally East European items. This officer is wearing the bright orange brassard of the Joint Military Monitoring Commission (JMMC) of South African, Cuban and Angolan officers which monitored the 1988 disengagement.

SWATF rank insignia; the embroidered forms are in black and white on drab backing.

the casevac helicopters. Their role was to stabilise the wounded sufficiently to ensure survival until a doctor could take over. They also had to be prepared to defend themselves and their patients at any time. They wore nutria field dress, and were distinguishable only by a small badge on the right chest and by their medical bags. This Ops Medic on casevac duty at Ondangwa is carrying the full medical bag normally carried by doctors, as well as a stretcher. Working with ground forces, the kit would vary depending on whether he was working on foot, horseback or in a vehicle. The normal personal weapon was the R-5.

H1: UNITA captain, 1988

UNITA's standard field dress consists of a green uniform similar in cut to the South African nutria; many troops wore other uniforms or combinations, including early SA Army items and later nutria. Local guerrilla units were often hard to distinguish from civilians. This captain of the Regular Forces was attached to one of

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